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UNSHACKLING PLEA BARGAINING FROM 
RACIAL BIAS 
ELAYNE E. GREENBERG* 
“History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, [but] if faced 
with courage, need not be lived again.” 
  Dr. Maya Angelou1 
 
When an African American male defendant tries to plea bargain an 
equitable justice outcome, he finds that the deep-rooted racial bias that casts 
African American men as dangerous, criminal and animalistic, compromises 
his justice rights. Plea bargaining has become the preferred process used to 
secure convictions for upwards of 97 percent of cases because of its 
efficiency. This efficiency, however, comes at a cost. The structure and 
process of plea bargaining makes it more likely that the historical racial bias 
that exists against African American male defendants will taint the 
negotiation process and justice outcomes. The racial profiling by the police, 
the presumption of guilt rather than innocence for African American men, 
the prosecutor’s discretion when charging the defendant, and the justice 
negotiation’s speed all contribute to the harsher negotiated sentences that 
African American male defendants receive compared to white male 
 
 * Professor Elayne E. Greenberg is the Assistant Dean for Dispute Resolution, Professor 
of Legal Practice and Faculty Director of the Hugh L. Carey Center for Dispute Resolution at 
St. John’s Law School. My thanks to my colleagues at the AALS ADR Section Works-in-
Progress Conference held at UNLV October 4–5, 2019. Special thanks to Professors Cynthia 
Alkon, M. Eva Hanan, Sheldon Evans, Anna Roberts and Charles Bobis for their different 
perspectives and insightful suggestions for this paper, and to Ashley Koefer (‘11), Supervising 
Attorney at Brooklyn Defender Services, for her thoughtful critique of the plea-bargaining 
worksheet. Thank you, Robert, for your thorough review. My appreciation to my research 
assistants, John T. Burger (‘20) for his thoughtful comments, critical eye, and patient edits, 
and Danielle Marino (‘21) for helping to finalize the edits. 
 1 MAYA ANGELOU, ON THE PULSE OF THE MORNING (1993). Angelou read the poem at 
President Bill Clinton’s January 21, 1993 inauguration. Francesca Trianni, Watch Maya 
Angelou Read a Poem at Bill Clinton’s Inauguration, TIME (May 28, 2014, 10:58 AM), 
https://time.com/123204/maya-angelou-bill-clinton-inauguration/ [https://perma.cc/UD5E-
VYGN]. 
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defendants accused of similar crimes. These racially tainted outcomes 
threaten the integrity of our justice system, and the core of our democracy. 
This Article traces the origins of racial bias in plea bargaining by 
chronicling the historical relationship among three societal developments: 
slavery, the criminal justice system, and plea bargaining. The Article then 
explains how plea bargaining’s structure, as it exists today, allows these 
historical racial biases to manifest and fester. Culling from the research of 
cognitive psychologists, dispute system design scholars, and anti-racism 
educators, this Article prescribes organizational and procedural reforms to 
unshackle plea bargaining from racial bias. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article prescribes structural and procedural reforms to debias the 
plea bargaining process and help mitigate the racialized presumption of guilt 
that deprives African American male defendants2 of their justice rights.3 
Prosecutors use plea bargaining, our preeminent form of dispensing justice, 
to negotiate the resolution of upwards of 97 percent of our criminal cases 
because it is efficient.4 However, when legal actors are negotiating the 
possible justice outcomes for African American male defendants, this 
efficient plea bargaining process also primes the deep-rooted racial biases of 
the legal actors to emerge and discriminatorily shape those outcomes.5 These 
historically-rooted racial biases, known as implicit racial biases, then form a 
presumption of guilt for African American male defendants.6 
Cognitive behavioral psychologists posit that legal actors involved in 
plea bargaining are more likely than other legal actors to have their implicit 
biases influence their decision-making process because of the confluence of 
three factors. First, the legal actors involved in plea bargaining are often 
unaware of their racial biases because such racial animus is counter to their 
 
 2 This Article focuses on African American male defendants because they have suffered 
from a deeply rooted racism that has stereotypically regarded African American men as 
dangerous and prone to criminality. This focus, however, is not to the exclusion of other forms 
of discrimination and unfair bias. The ideas expressed in this paper have something to offer 
more broadly beyond a particular understanding of an “African American male defendant.” 
 3 See KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, 
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 269 (2010) (noting how blackness is 
synonymous with criminality). 
 4 Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.c
om/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ [https://perma.cc/Y69J-
65A3]. 
 5 See, e.g., Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1215 (2018) (finding racial disparities in plea bargaining outcomes 
between white and Black defendants, specifically that white defendants have a greater 
likelihood than Black defendants of having their initial charges reduced in plea bargaining); 
Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012) [hereinafter Smith & Levinson, 
The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias] (explaining how prosecutorial discretion contributes to 
racialized justice outcomes in plea bargaining). 
 6 See, e.g., IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert L. Smith 
eds., 2012) [hereinafter IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW]. Some scholars assert that 
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty is an ideal that does not reflect the 
presumption of guilt attached to all defendants as soon as they are arrested. See, e.g., Anna 
Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2019) (explaining how this presumption of 
guilt is stronger and harder to overcome if the defendant is an African American male). 
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motivation to work in the criminal justice system “to do good.”7 Second, the 
speed of the plea-bargaining process allows the legal actors’ racial biases to 
remain unchecked.8 Third, the broad, unfettered discretion of the legal actors 
involved in plea bargaining allows racial biases to shape charging and justice 
outcomes.9 
Consequently, African American male defendants know all too well that 
our criminal justice system’s supposed guarantees of “justice for all” and 
“innocent until proven guilty” do not apply to them. Even though 
“presumption of innocence” is a legal10 and human right,11 the data show that 
African American male defendants suffer a racialized presumption of guilt 
in every part of the criminal system, including plea bargaining.12 The data 
are bone-chilling. In the United States, African Americans are 5.9 times more 
likely to be incarcerated than whites.13 By the end of 2017, eighteen- and 
nineteen-year-old Black males were about twelve times more likely to be 
 
 7 See, e.g., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES 
OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013) (explaining how we all, despite our best intentions, unconsciously 
absorb cultural biases); IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 6 (discussing how 
implicit racial bias adversely impacts the justice outcomes for black defendants to such an 
extent that black defendants have become synonymous with criminality); SHANKAR 
VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN (2010) (detailing how the part of our brain that is unconscious 
may shape our decision-making in a way that contradicts our stated values). 
 8 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 86–87 (2011) (explaining System 1 
thinking in which fast, unconscious thinking allows biases to emerge). 
 9 See Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5 (looking at how 
the broad discretion of prosecutors in charging defendants and in plea bargaining allows 
prosecutors’ implicit racial biases to emerge and shape prosecutors’ decision-making). 
 10 See, e.g., John A. Seiff, The Presumption of Innocence, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
53 (1934); Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim, 
63 JURIST: STUD. CHURCH L. & MINISTRY 106 (2003). 
 11 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 73 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 12 See Ojmarrh Mitchell & Michael S. Caudy, Examining Racial Disparities in Drug 
Arrests, 32 JUST. Q. 288 (2015); BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, 
PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY: TECHNICAL REPORT (2014), 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247227.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7WK-P5F3]; LINDSEY DEVERS, 
BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011), 
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/PleaBargainingResearchSu
mmary.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4KB-GK8R]; WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (2011) (citing discrimination against black suspects as one of 
the three causes for the dysfunction of our criminal justice system); JAMES FORMAN JR., 
LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 155 (2017) (discussing 
how police presume black youth in “high-crime” black communities are guilty, reinforcing 
the stereotype of black people as criminals). 
 13 JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2017 1 
(2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW6C-KAW7]. 
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imprisoned than their white counterparts.14 Substantiating the data, the real-
life stories of the countless African American male defendants who have 
suffered discriminatory injustices in our criminal justice system plague our 
moral core and galvanize us to enact reforms. Professor Henry L. Gates,15 
the Central Park Five,16 Michael Brown Jr.,17 Eric Garner,18 Freddie Gray,19 
Alton Sterling,20 Tamir Rice,21 Emmet Till,22 and Anthony Ray Hinton23 are 
among the long list of African American males who have suffered racial 
injustices in our criminal justice system.24 In the few short months while this 
Article was readying for publication, Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, and 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates was arrested and charged with robbery as he was 
trying to enter his own house. Elayne E. Greenberg, Dispute Resolution Lessons Gleaned from 
the Arrest of Professor Gates and “The Beer Summit,” 25 ST. JOHNS J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 91 
(2010). 
 16 N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial 
Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2004). 
 17 Timothy Williams, Five Years After Michael Brown’s Death, His Father Wants a New 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 2:47 P.M.), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/
us/ferguson-michael-brown.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Ftimothy-williams&action
=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest
&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=collection [https://perma.cc/D85R-U3T7] (“[His death] set 
into motion profound changes in policing, race relations and society that continue to 
reverberate.”). 
 18 Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for 
the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten
-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html?smid=pl-share 
[https://perma.cc/3NXU-ZDT4]. 
 19 Camila Domonoske, Prosecutors Drop All Remaining Charges Against Officers in 
Freddie Gray’s Death, NPR (July 27, 2016, 9:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/07/27/487606743/prosecutors-drop-all-remaining-charges-against-officers-in-
freddie-grays-death [https://perma.cc/UX4Q-DFG2]. 
 20 Jason Hanna, No Charges Against Officers in Alton Sterling Death; Other Videos Are 
Coming, CNN (Mar. 27, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/27/us/alton-sterling-
investigation/index.html [https://perma.cc/H272-RSTC]. 
 21 Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting Disappear, GQ 
(July 14, 2016), https://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-story [https://perma.cc/6MG8-UFP9]. 
 22 Emmett Till, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/crime-figure/emmett-till 
[https://perma.cc/VC5K-JDPE] (last updated June 23, 2020). 
 23 Anthony Ray Hinton, How I Got 30 Years on Death Row for Someone Else’s Crime, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/27/anthony-ray-
hinton-death-row-a-legal-lynching-alabama-crime [https://perma.cc/S5H4-WWFN]. 
 24 Unfortunately, the number of African American men who have suffered racial injustices 
in the criminal justice system extends far beyond the names listed. 
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Rayshard Brooks were added to the list of those African American men.25 
And the list keeps growing. 
As the data and stories of injustice bring to light, this racialized 
presumption of guilt influences who the police profile as criminal suspects,26 
the manner in which law enforcement engages with criminal suspects and 
witnesses in the community,27 the way in which the police interrogate 
suspects, the charges brought against defendants,28 the plea bargaining 
negotiations, and the final sentence.29 Looking back on U.S. history, this 
racialized presumption of guilt is anchored in the United States’ deep, 
racially discriminatory roots that built a society, an economy, and a criminal 
justice system on slavery.30 Under this discriminatory caste system, enslaved 
African American males were stereotypically regarded as dangerous, 
aggressive, animalistic, likely to use weapons, and prone to criminality.31 
 
 25 Eliott C. McLaughlin, Ahmaud Arbery Was Hit with a Truck Before He Died and His 
Killer Allegedly Used a Racial Slur, Investigator Testifies, CNN (June 4, 2020, 10:44 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/04/us/mcmichaels-hearing-ahmaud-arbery/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/G3PP-U2KV]; What We Know About the Death of George Floyd in 
Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html 
[https://perma.cc/F794-8YYN]; Christina Maxouris, Rayshard Brooks Was Killed a Day 
Before He Planned to Celebrate His Daughter’s Birthday, CNN (June 15, 2020, 9:02 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/14/us/rayshard-brooks-atlanta-shooting/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/T6FW-7TST]. 
 26 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 6 (discussing how this presumption of guilt at the time of 
arrest is stronger and harder to overcome if the defendant is an African American male). 
 27 See, e.g., Rory Kramer & Brianna Remster, Stop, Frisk, and Assault? Racial Disparities 
in Police Use of Force During Investigatory Stops, 52 L. & SOC’Y REV. 960, 975 (2018) 
(finding that black civilians in New York face 27% higher odds of experiencing some form of 
force during a stop compared to white citizens and 28% higher odds of having an officer draw 
a firearm during the interaction); see also Devin W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC 
L. REV. 548 (2017) (detailing that the more law-abiding citizens in the community have 
contact with the police, the higher their risk becomes of being profiled). 
 28 See, e.g., Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1215 (finding that black defendants in Wisconsin 
were nearly twenty-five percent less likely to have their top charge dropped or reduced than 
their white counterparts). 
 29 A Georgia study found that murders with white victims are eleven times more likely to 
result in a death sentence than those committed against Black people. David C. Baldus, 
Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An 
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 709 (1983). 
 30 See, e.g., The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.c
om/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/6K25-N4
A2]. 
 31 See, e.g., Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 798, 
808 (discussing how prosecutorial discretion allows the prosecutor’s implicit biases to emerge 
and causes racially disparate charging and plea bargaining outcomes); PAMELA NEWKIRK, 
SPECTACLE: THE ASTONISHING LIFE OF OTA BENGA (2015) (chronicling how Ota Benga, an 
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This racialized presumption of guilt was reinforced during the 1920s when 
the criminal justice system, born and evolved from a society that 
discriminated against African Americans, developed into a more professional 
enterprise in which full-time police made arrests and prosecutors brought 
charges.32 Scholars have observed that creating full-time police and 
prosecutors reinforced the presumption of guilt towards defendants.33 The 
United States further reinforced the racialized presumption of guilt during 
the 1990s when it supported police racial profiling, unauthorized searches, 
and pretextual stops to promote its War on Drugs and Violence.34 To the 
horror of many, this racialized presumption of guilt remains embedded in our 
culture,35 economics,36 politics,37 and criminal justice system38 and 
continues to be further stoked today.39 
 
African man, was captured, caged and shown, reinforcing the bias that African males were 
animalistic); JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED 134–52 (2019); Jerry Kang, Judge Mark 
Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, 
Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1135–37 (2012) [hereinafter Implicit Bias in the Courtroom]; HENRY 
LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE ROAD : RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF 
JIM CROW 36 (2019) (chronicling with narration and illustrations the countless ways the freed 
slave was kept enslaved during the Reconstruction and Jim Crow era and its relevance today). 
 32 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 247, 257 (1979) [hereinafter Friedman, Plea Bargaining]. 
 33 Id. The public attributed a legitimacy to the action of professional police and 
prosecutors. After all, why would professional law enforcement arrest an individual and bring 
charges against them if there wasn’t a legitimate reason? 
 34 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, 167–71 (critically examining how the government’s 
policies to combat crimes had racially disparate justice outcomes). 
 35 Nikita Stewart, ‘We Are Committing Educational Malpractice’: Why Slavery is 
Mistaught—and Worse—in American Schools, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/19/magazine/slavery-american-schools.html 
[https://perma.cc/27UF-GYWJ]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See, e.g., Cassia Spohn, Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-
First Centuries, 44 CRIME & JUST. 49 (2015) (calling for an overhaul of sentencing procedures 
such as the elimination or severely restricted use of the death penalty and sentencing those 
convicted of non-serious crimes to diversion programs to reduce racial disparities); Berdejó, 
supra note 5; IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 6 (discussing how implicit 
racial bias contaminates criminal justice decision-making). 
 39 See, e.g., Spohn, supra note 38; Berdejó, supra note 5; IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS 
THE LAW, supra note 6; Vanessa Williamson & Isabella Gelfand, Trump and Racism: What 
Do the Data Say?, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/fixgov/2019/08/14/trump-and-racism-what-do-the-data-say/ [https://perma.cc/4E5B-
2T3X] (noting how President Trump’s racist rhetoric is causing an increase in hate crimes); 
Mark Peterson, Claudia Racine & James D. Walsh, This Is America: The White Nationalists 
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Legal scholars and criminal law activists have called for a total overhaul 
of the criminal justice system to put an end to this system of racialized 
injustice.40 Although considered a laudable goal by many,41 such reform 
takes time, and that delay maintains the status quo. This Article focuses 
instead on debiasing reforms in the plea-bargaining process as a more 
immediate and realistic approach to stopping the cycle of racialized justice. 
There are three justifications for this choice. First, the proposed reforms 
target the plea-bargaining process—the primary form of criminal justice 
decision making42 and a hub of racialized injustice—to readily yield 
improved justice outcomes for those African American male defendants 
whose cases will be plea bargained. Because of the racialized presumption of 
guilt, African American male defendants who plea bargain in state criminal 
courts are more likely to be presumed guilty—even when factually 
innocent.43 Furthermore, those African American male defendants who are 
guilty of a crime and opt to plea bargain are often penalized with harsher 
outcomes because of their race.44 This must change. 
 
Among Us, INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 19, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/12/white-
supremacy-terrorism-in-america-2019.html [https://perma.cc/59QF-EVTC] (documenting 
how the resurgence of white supremacy since President Trump’s election is a continuation of 
the racism that has been institutionalized since the Civil War). 
 40 See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 12; Spohn, supra note 38, at 49; NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. 
LAW., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF 
EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 3 (2018) [hereinafter THE TRIAL PENALTY], 
https://www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport/ [https://perma.cc/UEM5-5F89] (explaining that 
fewer than 3% of criminal defendants exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial because 
the prosecutor threatens the defendant with a higher sentence if the defendant refuses the 
offered plea bargain and proceeds with trial). 
 41 See Spohn, supra note 38. 
 42 See THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40. 
 43 See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 
20, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ 
[https://perma.cc/WYA7-BVXM] (suggesting that greater information sharing between the 
prosecutor and defense attorney, and magistrate involvement before the plea bargaining 
process helped minimize the estimated two to eight percent of those innocent defendants who 
plead guilty); see also NYCLA Justice Center Task Force: Solving the Problem of Innocent 
People Pleading Guilty, 40 PACE L. REV. 1, 4 (2020) [hereinafter NYCLA Justice Center Task 
Force Report], https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2016&context=
plr [https://perma.cc/R5W5-U8FA] (formulating recommendations to address the reasons 
why innocent defendants may plead guilty such as reducing the number of court appearances 
and creating protocols that would ease access and communication between incarcerated 
defendants and defense lawyers). 
 44 E.g., M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal 
Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1321 (2014) (finding that average sentences for black 
defendants in federal court were ninety months for black defendants and fifty-five months for 
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Second, the universe of legal actors that can reform the plea-bargaining 
process is discretely defined. These actors include defense lawyers, 
prosecutors, and their respective offices. Unlike other criminal reform ideas 
that require legislative changes and significant budgetary support, the 
reforms suggested here just require acceptance by prosecutors and defense 
attorneys.45 
Third, prosecutors and defense attorneys, the primary plea-bargaining 
negotiators, are also the legal actors initially drawn to this practice area to 
“do justice.” This committed group is more likely to be receptive to 
reforming the plea-bargaining process and deliver more racially neutral 
justice than apathetic legal actors who accept the status quo.46 
A threshold issue in developing this proposal for reform is 
understanding why prosecutors and defense counsel, legal actors committed 
to enforcing justice, still plea bargain in such a racially biased way. The 
“why” provides the foundational justification for the proposals recommended 
later in this Article. Cognitive behavioral scholars educate that our racialized 
history has also remained embedded in our culture and has become 
memorialized in an unconscious network of neurons that form our implicit 
biases about African American males.47 All Americans have these implicit 
 
white defendants between 2008 and 2009); see also Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1215 (finding 
that black defendants in Wisconsin were nearly 25% less likely to have their top charge 
dropped or reduced than their white counterparts). 
 45 As a part of effective dispute system design, the dispute system designer must identify 
the discretely defined universe of legal actors who are motivated and can take responsibility 
for implementing plea bargaining reforms to increase the likelihood that the prescribed 
recommendation will successfully be implemented. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An 
Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009); see 
also Pon Staff, What is Dispute System Design?, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM ON NEGOT. DAILY 
BLOG (June 15, 2020), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/dispute-resolution/what-is-dispute-
system-design/ [https://perma.cc/9MT8-V3PD]. 
 46 See, e.g., Liane Jackson, Change Agents: A New Wave of Reform Prosecutors Upends 
the Status Quo, ABA J. (June 1, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/change-
agents-reform-prosecutors; ERIC GONZALEZ, BROOKLYN DISTRICT ATT’Y, JUSTICE 2020: AN 
ACTION PLAN FOR BROOKLYN (2019), http://www.brooklynda.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/03/Justice2020-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TKQ-XCLH]; THE TRIAL PENALTY, 
supra note 40; Colyn Eppes, TRR Partner Lew Tesser Chairs Plea-Bargaining Task Force, 
TESSER RYAN BLOG (Apr. 12, 2019), http://tesserryan.com/trr-partner-lew-tesser-chairs-plea-
bargaining-task-force/ [https://perma.cc/L54G-FXTJ]; see also Our Work and Vision, FAIR & 
JUST PROSECUTION, https://fairandjustprosecution.org/about-fjb/our-work-and-vision/ [https:
//perma.cc/9RUV-FJSY] [hereinafter FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION] (last visited Sept. 7, 2019) 
(explaining the mission of public prosecutors who wish to work together to develop 
innovations that will promote better justice outcomes). 
 47 See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7 (explaining how implicit biases are formed). 
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biases.48 Thus, even though we may explicitly reject the United States’ 
discriminatory behavior, and it may appall us, we may still internalize the 
racially discriminatory messages the media and broader culture communicate 
to us.49 
Relevant to this Article’s point, these implicit biases influence the legal 
actors in our criminal justice system, including the prosecutors and defense 
attorneys who are the primary legal actors in plea bargaining.50 Therefore, 
although prosecutors and defense attorneys may not be explicitly biased, they 
are still prone to unconsciously regard African American men as dangerous, 
aggressive, likely to use weapons, and prone to criminality.51 Such implicit 
biases contaminate every aspect of the plea-bargaining process including the 
evidence relied upon,52 the severity of the initial charges,53 and the final 
sentencing agreement.54 This implicit bias infects defense attorneys and 
prosecutors alike, as well as the organizations that employ them.55 
 
 48 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
969, 970–71 (2006). 
 49 See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7; MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF 
THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005) (explaining how our quick judgements or heuristics, 
such as the ones prosecutors make about African American defendants, are likely to reflect 
our biases); EBERHARDT, supra note 31. 
 50 See, e.g., Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racal Bias in Public Defender 
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (calling attention to the unconscious racial biases of public 
defenders and suggesting how public defenders might mitigate their racial biases); Carly Will 
Sloan, Racial Bias by Prosecutors: Evidence from Random Assignment (Dec. 28, 2019), 
https://github.com/carlywillsloan/Prosecutors/blob/master/191228_sloan_jmp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R2Q3-F8Z4]; Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31. 
 51 Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 798, 808; see 
Duru, supra note 16, at 1357. Ironically, prosecutors and defense attorneys have their racial 
implicit biases reinforced when they are working in a justice system that arrests and convicts 
a disproportionate number of black defendants. 
 52 See Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1237; Celesta A. Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to 
Explain Judicial Discretion, 38 SOC. PROBS. 247, 250 (1991). 
 53 See Berdejó, supra note 5, at 1191. 
 54 See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence 
from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 306 (2001). 
 55 See, e.g., Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5; Andrea 
D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755 (2012) (alerting criminal defense attorneys to develop heightened 
awareness of their own racial biases); Jeff Adachi, Public Defenders Can Be Biased, Too, and 
It Hurts Their Non-White Clients, WASH. POST (June 7, 2016, 11:31 AM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/07/public-defenders-can-be-biased-too-and-it-
hurts-their-non-white-clients/ [https://perma.cc/H9C3-9CRR] (explaining how a public 
defender helps himself and office colleagues develop a heightened awareness of his own 
implicit racial biases). 
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The plea-bargaining process is particularly susceptible to becoming 
infected by implicit racial bias. During plea bargaining, the racialized 
presumption of guilt emerges, thrives, and shapes justice outcomes. Applying 
the research of implicit bias scholars, we can understand how legal actors’ 
lack of self-awareness about their own racialized biases,56 the justice 
system’s driving need to use plea bargaining for efficient justice 
resolutions,57 and attorneys’ broad discretion in the plea bargain process58 all 
contribute to make plea bargaining a process that enables implicit biases 
about African American male defendants. 
Anti-racist educators contribute to this discussion by explaining that we 
will not be able to manage our implicit racial biases unless we are also 
prepared to take responsibility for how we benefit from maintaining the status 
quo.59 Acknowledging our implicit biases is not an excuse for failing to own 
up to all the personal benefits we may have enjoyed from living in a racially 
discriminatory society.60 Although awareness of our implicit biases is a first 
step, more must be done.61 We must then own the deleterious impacts of bias, 
discard our defenses about our racist beliefs, and examine the ramifications 
of maintaining the status quo before we can effect meaningful societal 
change.62 
This Article expands the scholarship about plea bargaining by “naming 
the elephant in the room” and tackling how to mitigate the implicit racial bias 
in plea bargaining.63 The author prescribes organizational and individual 
 
 56 See Chris Chambers Goodman, Shadowing the Bar: Attorneys’ Own Implicit Bias, 28 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 18, 43 (2018). 
 57 See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. 
L. REV. 183, 189 (2014). 
 58 See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1303, 1306 (2018); Rakoff, supra note 43. 
 59 See, e.g., ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY (2018); EBERHARDT, supra note 31; 
IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING (2016). These authors call for whites to 
accept responsibility and take steps to develop a self-awareness of their implicit racial biases 
and how this racism has advantaged them at the expense of black Americans. 
 60 DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 140–54. 
 61 Id. (discussing steps to address racism and white fragility). 
 62 See, e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 141–48. 
 63 Surprisingly, there is a paucity of scholarship about the negotiation process in plea 
bargaining, and the initial scholarship that does exist has suggested how plea bargaining could 
be improved by using a more interest-focused approach. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, 
Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997); 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163 (2007); Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for 
Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445 (2016) (commenting on the lack of plea bargaining 
 
104 GREENBERG [Vol. 111 
reforms for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the organizations they work 
within to address this implicit racial bias in plea bargaining. The suggested 
reforms create a more intentional plea-bargaining process, heighten 
awareness of the implicit racial bias of the legal actors involved in plea 
bargaining, and incentivize greater accountability for racialized justice 
outcomes in plea bargaining. The proposals integrate the work of cognitive 
behavioral psychologists,64 anti-racism educators,65 dispute system 
designers,66 negotiation scholars,67 and criminal justice reformers.68 
This discussion will take place in four parts. Part I chronicles the 
racialized roots of our country and our evolving criminal justice system, 
within which plea bargaining has emerged and evolved. This Part puts 
forward the dominant theories that explain why this racial animus has 
persisted. Part II looks at plea bargaining practice today. Shifting to the lens 
of implicit bias and anti-racist scholars, this Part shows how our racially 
discriminatory history has shaped prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ 
implicit racial biases and the racialized presumption of guilt. Part III 
prescribes remedial organizational and individual interventions to help 
district attorneys’ offices, public defenders’ organizations, and individual 
defense attorneys and prosecutors contain their racialized implicit biases as 
they negotiate justice for African American male defendants. The Article 
concludes that the goal of the proposed reforms is to ensure that African 
American male defendants who negotiate their justice outcomes do so 
unshackled from racial bias. 
 
training for defense lawyers); Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining 
Competence Beyond Lafler and Frye, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377 (2016) [hereinafter Alkon, 
Plea Bargain Negotiations]; Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the 
Dark: The Need for Transparency and Data in Plea Bargaining, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434 
(2019) [hereinafter Schneider & Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark]; Ronald F. Wright, Jenny 
Roberts & Betina Cutaia Wilkinson, The Shadow Bargainers, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (offering empirical research comparing and contrasting the different plea bargaining 
approaches between prosecutors who negotiated in the “shadow of the trial” and defense 
attorneys who negotiated in the “shadow of the client”). 
 64 See, e.g., BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7; Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra 
note 31; Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5. 
 65 See, e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 59; EBERHARDT, supra note 31; KENDI, supra note 59; 
IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST (2019). 
 66 See, e.g., Smith & Martinez, supra note 45. 
 67 See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (2011). 
 68 See, e.g., Schneider & Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 63. 
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I. THE HISTORICAL ETIOLOGY OF RACISM IN PLEA BARGAINING AND THE 
U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
One can best understand plea bargaining as a component of the U.S. 
criminal justice system through the racialized societal values, objectives, and 
cultural forces in which plea bargaining was born and has matured.69 There 
are three sociological theories of causation that help us understand why 
racism began and persists.70 Critical race theorists such as Richard Delgado 
postulate that U.S. legislators hierarchically structured our laws to maintain 
white privilege and Black inferiority.71 Through a critical race theorist lens, 
these legislators based our laws and criminal justice policies on a racism 
intended to maintain this biased social hierarchy.72 Through a slightly 
different lens, conflict theorists such as Austin Turk assert that persistent 
racism is about the dominant group maintaining social control.73 According 
to conflict theorists, our criminal justice system applies law to reinforce the 
power of the politically and economically dominant group while 
simultaneously controlling the power of racial minorities who threaten the 
dominant group’s social control.74 Proposing a third theory about why racism 
persists, attribution theorists assert that, when there is inadequate objective 
information, criminal justice enforcers such as police, probation officers, and 
judges make racist decisions based on heuristics that African American 
defendants are prone to criminality.75 For attribution theorists, the 
defendant’s race evokes criminal justice enforcers implicit biases about 
African American men and biases justice decision making.76 
Whether you read this Section through the lens of any of these three 
sociological theories or just for historical interest, you will find each frame 
complements the others and expands our understanding about pernicious 
racism in our criminal justice system. Historical racism has also created a 
racial implicit bias that contaminates the plea-bargaining process today. This 
first part of this Section chronicles the evolution of the racialized 
 
 69 Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 258. 
 70 Spohn, supra note 38 , at 52–54. 
 71 See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY 27–29 (2d ed. 
2012); see also Spohn, supra note 38, at 52. 
 72 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995) 
(explaining how the law accepted race as a biological fact and reinforced black subjugation). 
 73 AUSTIN T. TURK, CRIMINALITY AND LEGAL ORDER (1969) (focusing on how those in 
authority assert control when there are legal violations); Spohn, supra note ,38, at 53. 
 74 TURK, supra note 73; Spohn, supra note 38, at 53. 
 75 Darnell F. Hawkins, Explaining the Black Homicide Rate, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 151, 154 (1990); Spohn, supra note 38, at 53. 
 76 Hawkins, supra note 76, at 160–61; Spohn, supra note 38, at 53. 
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presumption of guilt in plea bargaining by examining how the history of the 
criminal justice system and the history of discrimination against African 
Americans are inextricably linked. Who are targeted as criminal? What 
behavior is criminalized? How are laws disparately applied? How is justice 
delivered? Race determines the answers to all these questions. The second 
part of this Section narrates the evolution of plea bargaining. As part of that 
discussion, the reader will see how our criminal justice history and the United 
States’ history of discrimination against African Americans converged to 
shape the racialized presumption of guilt that exists in plea bargaining today. 
A. THE INEXTRICABLE LINK BETWEEN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM AND THE HISTORICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
AFRICAN AMERICANS 
From its inception, our criminal justice system evolved within a country 
that was founded on the dehumanization of and discrimination against 
African Americans.77 Expectedly, this discriminatory animus contaminated 
every aspect of the criminal justice system, biasing the interpretation and 
application of racially-neutral legal codes.78 Ironically, while the citizenry 
embarked on developing a criminal justice system that was meant to be fair 
and just, it simultaneously embraced its racist legacy and discriminatory 
beliefs against African Americans. Sadly, that same struggle continues today. 
The American Revolution galvanized the colonists to create a criminal 
justice system that was fairer and more just than the oppressive British 
system.79 This goal was evident from the multiple safeguards the colonists 
incorporated into their developing criminal justice system. For example, both 
the Bill of Rights and state constitutions reinforced the importance of fair 
trials and just punishments that were proportional to the crime committed.80 
Criminal codification, the process by which crimes would be “open, 
transparent and easy to know,” was also viewed as a necessary safeguard to 
protect the colonists against a reoccurrence of the abuse they had endured 
under the King’s rule.81 The goal was to create a criminal justice system that 
could not be misused for retaliating against those taking unpopular political 
stances.82 Another safeguard that protected against the harms they 
 
 77 See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 433–53 (3d ed. 
2005) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW] (narrating how the developing 
criminal justice system reflected the discriminatory values of the time). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 207. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 215. 
 82 See id. 
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experienced was to disfavor the death penalty as a punishment for theft and 
only to use it as a last resort.83 Instead, some colonists considered the 
restitution of property and hard labor as more appropriate punishments for 
theft.84 
The goal of labeling a behavior as “criminal” was to reinforce the social 
and economic hierarchy and to maintain control of those on the bottom.85 
Thus, the decision to label a behavior as “criminal” was and remains a fluid 
concept. During the colonial era of the 1700s, the citizenry viewed crime as 
a public wrong that hurt society.86 The primary goal of criminal law was to 
enforce the existing social morality.87 Although fornication and drunkenness 
were the most frequently punished crimes, behavior such as gaming, 
idleness, and lying were also considered criminal.88 At that time, the public 
considered crime a symptom of societal ills such as family problems, poverty, 
or inappropriate companions, and, as a social problem, they could not be 
remedied by the death penalty.89 Rather, the purposes of punishment were 
“to deter crime and rehabilitate the criminal.”90 
Moreover, the public elite criminalized these activities to maintain 
economic control.91 For example, society criminalized fornication to 
maintain the accepted morality of the time and because it was concerned with 
who would support any children that resulted from such a “sinful act.”92 
Times change, and with them, so did criminal justice’s priorities. After the 
Revolution, as economic crimes increased, the criminal justice system’s 
focus shifted more to protecting property and less to proscribing 
fornication.93 
Even though the colonists wanted to create a fair and just criminal 
justice system, the safeguards they adopted to protect against unfair 
prosecution and tyranny did not apply to Black people in the South.94 Rather, 
society subjected enslaved people and those disfavored in the lower social 
 
 83 See id. at 33. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. at 36, 37. 
 86 Id. at 37. 
 87 Id. at 35. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 208. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See id. at 37. 
 92 Id. at 36. 
 93 Id. at 218. 
 94 Id. at 436. 
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order to the uneven and biased enforcement of criminal laws95 and 
disproportionate capital sentences.96 Slave codes further reinforced the 
community biases against African Americans.97 In the slave codes, as well 
as other laws, enslaved African Americans were considered chattel and 
forbidden to learn to read.98 Those free African Americans who were living 
in the North also experienced discrimination as a result of the deeply 
entrenched racist ideas that America was founded on and were subjected to 
the racially disparate application of criminal laws.99 
At about the same time as our criminal justice system was beginning to 
develop after the Revolutionary War, the first vigilante or self-help justice 
groups were also forming.100 These vigilante groups proliferated in the West 
buoyed by the conviction that “swift and terrible retribution is the only 
preventive course, while society is organizing in the far West.”101 A variant 
of these vigilante groups were the slave patrols made up of local citizens.102 
These patrols would catch and whip enslaved people who were on the streets 
past curfew or without the requisite pass from their owners.103 In 1767, the 
 
 95 See id. at 35. 
 96 Id. at 209. 
 97 See id. at 36. 
 98 See generally John M. Mecklin, The Evolution of Slave Status in American Democracy, 
2 J. NEGRO HIST. 229, 250 (1917) (discussing how the slave codes treated slaves as “irrational” 
chattel while denying them the opportunity to learn to read and write); see also Rachel L. 
Swarns, The Nuns Who Bought and Sold Human Beings, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/opinion/sunday/nuns-slavery.html 
[https://perma.cc/UE5B-KNM2] (describing the history of racism in the Catholic Church and 
how one group of nuns sold their slaves and separated slave families to fund their commitment 
to free education for the poor). 
 99 See, e.g., Mecklin, supra note 98; see also SHERRILYN A. IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE 
LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2018). 
101 See FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 77, at 440; cf. Anna North, “The 
Oppression Doesn’t End It, It Adapts”: America’s History of Lynching and Its Resonance 
Today, VOX (updated June 20, 2020, 12:23 PM), https://www.vox.com/21295670/robert-
fuller-malcolm-harsch-hanging-history-lynching [https://perma.cc/2NSE-SCRZ]; Ben Yakas, 
NYPD Investigating Suicide of Black Man Found Hanging from Tree in Manhattan Park, 
GOTHAMIST (June 17, 2020, 4:03 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/nypd-investigating-
suicide-black-man-found-hanging-tree-manhattan-park [https://perma.cc/87LB-7RQK]; Jake 
Offenhartz, Report of Nooses in Van Cortlandt Park Met by NYPD Indifference, Bronxites 
Allege, GOTHAMIST (June 19, 2020, 4:27 PM), 
https://gothamist.com/news/reports-nooses-van-cortlandt-park-met-nypd-indifference-
bronxites-allege [https://perma.cc/PEN3-23EZ] (showing how lynching continues in 2020). 
 101 FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 77, at 440 (quoting THOMAS J. 
DIMSDALE, THE VIGILANTES OF MONTANA 13 (1953)). 
 102 Id. at 213. 
 103 Id. 
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first American vigilante group, the South Carolina Regulator, emerged.104 
After 1850 and abolition, vigilante groups proliferated and came in different 
iterations.105 For example, there were the claims clubs in the Midwest, 
miners’ courts,106 the Ku Klux Klan,107 and Judge Lynch108 in the southern 
border states. Although all these vigilante groups were about delivering their 
own form of extrajudicial justice, the Southern lynch mobs were known as 
the most brutal because “their law and order was naked racism, no more.”109 
At the conclusion of the Civil War, the United States abolished slavery, 
and all African Americans were ostensibly free. However, the Supreme Court 
countered and muted the Thirteenth,110 Fourteenth,111 and Fifteenth112 
Amendments, laws intended to reinforce African Americans’ rights to 
freedom, by limiting their application to state action.113 Jim Crow Laws, 
southern codes that sought to preserve the hierarchal status quo between 
white land owners and enslaved people, reaffirmed that African Americans 
were still “less than.”114 The Reconstruction period that was supposed to free 
enslaved people just continued slavery in a different form.115 For example, 
formerly enslaved people who worked for a share of profits on the same 
plantation that they worked when they were enslaved often were deprived of 
 
 104 Id. at 440. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. (resolving disputes over mining rights). 
 107 Id. at 430 (maintaining white supremacy). 
 108 Id. at 440 (perpetuating black men’s enslavement by burning and hanging those who 
were accused of crimes). 
 109 Id. 
 110 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1–2 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 111 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 112 U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”). 
 113 See Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil 
Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 481, 481–82 (2006). 
 114 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 66. 
 115 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 105–11 (describing the Reconstructionist massacres by 
white citizens and law officials against black people); see also GATES, supra note 31. 
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the profits that they should have rightly earned.116 As Bryan Stevenson 
elegantly states: 
In many ways, you can say that the [N]orth won the Civil War, but the [S]outh won the 
narrative war. If the urgent narrative that we’re trying to deal with in this country is a 
narrative of racial difference. If the narrative that we have to overcome is a narrative of 
white supremacy, the south prevailed . . . . [A]nd that’s what we were dealing with at 
the beginning of the 20th century when we began an era where white supremacy, racial 
subordination, racial hierarchy is going to be enforced in a new way: lynching.117 
After Reconstruction and continuing into the mid-twentieth century, 
African Americans found that the type and quality of justice they received 
depended on which part of the country was dispensing the justice.118 For 
example, African Americans in the South found that the criminal justice 
system was augmented by mob rule.119 Similarly, justice in the West for 
African Americans was an amalgam of a somewhat effective justice system 
aided by vigilantism.120 In the Northeast and Midwest, however, African 
Americans had a greater likelihood of receiving fairer justice outcomes 
because these justice systems were relatively more stable and less punitive.121 
Still, researchers reported that African Americans received greater sentences 
than whites for similar crimes throughout the United States during the 1930s 
through the ‘60s.122 
For those formerly enslaved people who remained in the South, many 
increasingly found life in the South intolerable. During the Great Migration, 
formerly enslaved people sought greater opportunity in the North, free from 
the racial animus of the South. But many African Americans who migrated 
soon realized that, even in the North, they faced discrimination, just in a 
different form.123 For example, employers gave preference to European 
 
 116 See, e.g., ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF 
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010) (explaining that during Reconstruction many formerly 
enslaved people remained de facto enslaved because they worked on the same land, were 
charged for the land and living expenses, and either got little profits, no profits or in the worst 
scenario, owed a debt to the landowner). 
 117 TRUE JUSTICE: BRYAN STEVENSON’S FIGHT FOR EQUALITY (HBO 2019) [hereinafter 
TRUE JUSTICE DOCUMENTARY]. 
 118 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 130. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 134. 
 122 Spohn, supra note 38, at 73 (noting that researchers’ methodology and degree of actual 
racism was challenged). 
 123 FORMAN, supra note 12, at 88 (“No facet of African American life was exempt from 
the stranglehold of racism.”). 
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immigrants for many of the jobs African Americans sought.124 Further, as 
Historian Isabel Wilkins observed: 
“The century between Reconstruction and the end of the Great Migration perhaps may 
be seen as a necessary stage of upheaval. It was a transition from an era when one race 
owned another; to an era when the dominant class gave up ownership but kept control 
over the people it once owned, at all costs, using violence even; to the eventual 
acceptance of the servant caste in the mainstream.” 125 
Not only was there a racial divide between Black and white 
communities, a class divide also emerged between poor Black people and 
upper-middle class Black people.126 In poor Black neighborhoods, where 
there remains a higher crime rate than in white neighborhoods, society 
victimized—and continues to victimize—both Black criminals and Black 
victims.127 The police racially profile Black people as criminal suspects.128 
Because the crime rate is higher in Black neighborhoods, Black victims find 
that the police are less likely to respond seriously to their requests for help 
than to white victims.129 In this “racial tax,” police see Black citizens “first 
as potential criminals who need punishing, not as possible victims who need 
protecting.”130 Exacerbating this problem, Black communities, until recently, 
did not have the political power to elect officials who would advocate for 
them and remedy this problem.131 The result of the police’s discriminatory 
perception is that Black communities often do not receive the policing they 
need. 
During the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement called attention to the 
pervasive racial discrimination that African Americans suffered in every 
aspect of their lives, including the racist treatment by police departments. 132 
Fed up with such discriminatory treatment, Black citizens protested in the 
cities and demanded change.133 During these protests, Black citizens 
publicized the widespread police corruption and the police’s flagrant 
disregard of legal criminal procedures, especially towards Black people, such 
 
 124 See, e.g., id. at 89. 
 125 WILKERSON, supra note 116, at 538 (2010). 
 126 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 139 (talking about black-on-black crime). 
 127 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 22. 
 128 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 212. 
 129 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 22. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 7. 
 132 FORMAN, supra note 12, at 98. 
 133 Id. at 104. 
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as arresting suspects without warrants.134 Police abuse without any 
accountability and retribution had to change.135 Did it? 
During the ‘70s and ‘80s, the drug epidemic and gun violence plagued 
the country and threatened the viability of Black communities and their 
citizenry. Black communities referred to crack cocaine as “the worst thing to 
hit us since slavery.”136 Black leaders analogized the crack epidemic to the 
savagery Black people experienced at the hands of the Klan. Jesse Jackson 
asserted, “[n]o one has the right to kill our children . . . I won’t take it from 
the Klan with a rope; I won’t take it from a neighbor with dope.”137 
The United States fought back against the drug epidemic and gun 
violence with its War on Drugs. During the War on Drugs, the United States 
enacted punitive policing policies, stricter drug laws that penalized drug 
possession with the same severity as drug dealing, and mandatory minimum 
sentencing.138 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which 
included the Sentencing Reform Act, was one such sweeping criminal justice 
reform to accomplish these ends.139 The Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 was another.140 All of these criminal interventions 
had a racially disparate impact on African Americans. War was being waged, 
and African Americans were now presumed guilty, rather than innocent.141 
They endured repeated unprovoked searches and pretextual traffic stops. 142 
African American imprisonment rates were greater than those of Stalin’s 
Soviet Union.143 
The push for these criminal policies came not only from white 
politicians and their constituents, but also from Black officials and the Black 
middle class.144 What does it say about our country that the response to this 
drug crisis was with criminal solutions rather than root-cause solutions?145 
Both white and Black supporters failed to predict that these measures would 
 
 134 Id. at 98. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 151 (quoting the president of the NAACP). 
 137 Id. at 157. 
 138 Id. at 156. 
 139 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837. 
 140 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796.  
 141 FORMAN, supra note 12, at 155; see also Marcia G. Shein, Racial Disparity in Crack 
Cocaine Sentencing, 8 CRIM. JUST. 28, 61–62 (1993). 
 142 FORMAN, supra note 12, at 198. 
 143 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 253. 
 144 FORMAN, supra note 12, at 134 (detailing how government policies to combat crime 
had a disparate impact on the black community). 
 145 Id. at 157. 
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have such a racially disparate impact on poor, Black communities.146 Many 
consider these draconian criminal measures a leading cause of the racialized 
mass incarceration that exists today. 
William J. Stuntz reminds us that the mass incarceration of Black people 
today is, in fact, slavery.147 First, “incarceration is a form of slavery.”148 The 
Thirteenth Amendment provides, “[n]either slavery, nor involuntary 
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist in the United States.”149 However, because African 
American male defendants are forced to navigate a racialized criminal justice 
system, too many are deprived of a fair and just process and often unduly 
convicted. Second, prisoners, like enslaved people, are subjugated to the will 
of their jailers.150 Prison is all about subjugation, not rehabilitation. Third, 
incarceration, like slavery, is a way of controlling the poorest, least 
educated.151 Part of the subjugation is keeping the incarcerated poor and 
uneducated. A disproportionate number of black prisoners who are 
incarcerated do not receive the adequate training or education necessary to 
reenter the world as contributing citizens. Fourth, prisoners, like enslaved 
people, are unable to vote and decide who is chosen to rule. Even when Black 
people are finished serving their prison sentences, they remain shackled to 
their incarcerated status.152 Finally, as with the fear that surrounded ending 
slavery, a fear exists about reform efforts to reduce the number of 
incarcerated people.153 Thus, prison reform efforts to end the mass 
incarceration of Black men are blocked by entrenched, racialized fears. 
Professor Sheldon Evans offers a different analogy to illustrate how the 
racialized justice outcomes of our criminal justice system are a continuation 
of the discriminatory values underlying slavery. Professor Evans notes a 
 
 146 This failure to predict the harsh, disparate racial outcomes has been a topic of intense 
debate particularly in the midst of the 2020 Democratic primary debates. See, e.g., Shaquille 
Brewster & Adam Edelman, Kamala Harris Hits Biden Over ‘Mass Incarceration’ from 
Crime Bill, NBC NEWS (May 15, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-
election/kamala-harris-disputes-joe-biden-s-claims-about-1994-crime-n1006106 
[https://perma.cc/26BW-9G3M]. Senator Kamala Harris attacked Vice President Biden for 
drafting the 1994 crime bill that resulted in the mass incarceration of black people. While 
defending the bill’s preventative measures, Biden asserted that his intent was good, and the 
context in which the ‘94 bill was passed was different than today. 
 147 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 44. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
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sobering link between how society perpetuated slavery and our modern law 
enforcement system.154 “So, like the ‘slave catcher’ roots of our modern 
police force, law enforcement are incentivized to catch ‘criminals’ in African 
American communities, as their slave catching predecessors were, to return 
them to the racial hierarchy that maintained what they saw as a proper 
balance in society.”155 The modern system of criminal justice enforcement in 
the United States is in many ways a continuation of a slavery system that 
fosters racialized discrimination against African American male defendants. 
In the following part of this Section, the author will explain how the 
racialized presumption of guilt took hold in the plea-bargaining process. 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF PLEA BARGAINING AND THE RACIALIZED 
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT 
Plea bargaining is when a criminal defendant offers to plead guilty in 
return for concessions in the offenses charged and the sentences imposed.156 
This Part chronicles the evolution of plea bargaining. When plea bargaining 
finally became the primary justice resolution process for criminal cases, the 
legal actors involved continued to be influenced by the discriminatory 
animus that historically contaminated the criminal justice system. This 
discriminatory animus helped to shape the presumption of guilt towards 
African American male defendants and involve it in plea bargaining. 
Plea bargaining scholars disagree about when plea bargaining began to 
be used in the criminal justice system.157 One reason for this disagreement is 
that it is difficult to ascertain if a guilty plea before trial was a result of a plea 
bargain.158 Moreover, during the early 1800s, courts disfavored and 
discouraged guilty pleas.159 There were multiple reasons for the distrust of 
guilty pleas. First, from as far back as the 1600s, guilty pleas were often 
 
 154 Comments from Professor Sheldon Evans to author (Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Comments from Professor Sheldon Evans]; see also Gloria J. Browne-
Marshall, Stop and Frisk: From Slave-Catchers to NYPD, A Legal Commentary, 21 TROTTER 
REV. 98 (2013) (analogizing NYC Police Department’s stop and frisk policy to the Black 
Codes); Larry H. Spruill, Slave Patrols, “Packs of Negro Dogs” and Policing Black 
Communities, 53 PHYLON 42 (2016) (drawing the link between slave patrols and oppressive 
policing in black communities). 
 155 Comments from Professor Sheldon Evans, supra note 154. 
 156 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 213 
(1979). 
 157 See, e.g., Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 248; Alschuler, supra note 156, 
at 215; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA 4 (2003). 
 158 Alschuler, supra note 156, at 214. 
 159 Id. at 215–16. 
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coerced by the King.160 Second, there were concerns that the guilty plea 
might be entered by an innocent person who just was fearful, hopeless, or 
forgetful.161 Third, many defendants did not have attorneys.162 Fourth, at that 
time, the punishment for committing a felony was death, so defendants were 
less likely to voluntarily plead guilty to felony charges. 163 
Another reason it is difficult to determine the exact moment plea 
bargaining began is that it is difficult to distinguish between implicit and 
explicit plea bargaining.164 Implicit plea bargain refers to when “there is no 
actual bargaining but defendants realize they are better off if they plead 
guilty.”165 “Hence defendants who plead guilty strike a kind of bargain even 
though no word of a ‘deal’ has been spoken.”166 
The first regular use of plea bargaining is said to have taken place during 
the attempted resolution of Massachusetts liquor cases in 1824.167 The 
structure of the liquor law provided a defined dollar penalty for each 
enumerated offense, depriving judges of any sentencing discretion.168 
Prosecutors, however, had discretion. Unlike judges, prosecutors were able 
to use that discretion and charge defendants with lesser offenses that came 
with a lower dollar penalty.169 
Yet, during the 1800s there was no pressing need to mainstream plea 
bargaining. During that time, the criminal system was not yet 
professionalized and rendering justice was simpler than it is today. Public 
prosecutors worked part-time, and during the course of the 1800s, the police 
were first introduced as part of law enforcement.170 Even during the late 
1800s, the trial process was still simple and brief.171 A trial would last less 
than thirty minutes.172 During the trial, each side could present one or two 
witnesses before a jury rendered a verdict.173 There were still part-time 
prosecutors and no fingerprint or ballistic technology.174 
 
 160 See id. at 240–41, 241 n.35. 
 161 Id. at 225. 
 162 Id. at 217. 
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 167 See FISHER, supra note 157, at 25. 
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 171 See id. at 257–58. 
 172 Id. at 257. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
116 GREENBERG [Vol. 111 
It was not until the 1920s that explicit plea bargaining took hold.175 
Multiple reasons contributed to plea bargaining’s acceptance. First, the 
criminal justice system became more professionalized with the increased 
prevalence of police, prosecutors, and defense lawyers.176 This contributed 
to the court’s greater comfort with guilty pleas. Second, criminal law was 
also being shaped by the introduction of “the bondsman, the ward politician, 
the newspaper reporter, the jailer, and the fixer.”177 Third, there was an 
expansion of the criminal law.178 Fourth, with growing urbanization, there 
was a concomitant growth in crime.179 Particularly, there was a growth of 
victimless crimes such as liquor-prohibition cases that were harder to 
convict.180 Fifth, as political corruption infiltrated the criminal justice 
system, a “fixer” of some political influence, police officers, and court 
officers were all instrumental in helping procure pleas.181 Sixth, and finally, 
trials became longer and more complicated, making pleas a more efficient 
option.182 
One significant and unexpected change caused by the 
professionalization of our criminal justice system is that the presumption of 
innocence that had always existed until a defendant was proven guilty at the 
conclusion of a trial was replaced with a presumption of guilt when an arrest 
was made by the police and prosecutors who brought charges.183 This 
presumption of guilt, combined with racial animus towards African 
American defendants, made plea bargaining for African American men a 
 
 175 Alschuler, supra note 156, at 229. 
 176 Id. at 242. 
 177 Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the 
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 924 (1994). 
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 179 Id. at 242. 
 180 Id. at 230. 
 181 Id. at 228. 
 182 Alschuler, supra note 156, at 240. 
 183 See Friedman, Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 257. This is an “unexpected” 
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risky justice choice. Thus, the danger of plea bargaining is that the “factually 
innocent may be convicted” because they have negotiated away the 
protection of their trial rights.184 
Not only did plea bargaining grow, but so did guilty pleas. Researchers 
note that during the 1920s more convictions came from guilty pleas than 
bench or jury trials.185 There were several reasons that defendants pleaded 
guilty. First, prosecutors promised those already in jail that their case would 
be dealt with quickly if they pleaded guilty. If they did not, they would suffer 
long delays. Second, defendants were often represented by young, appointed 
lawyers who lacked experience and received little compensation.186 Thus, 
these lawyers encouraged their clients to plead guilty rather than suffer 
through a trial. Third, “court officers,” also known as “plead getters,” would 
frighten defendants who were already in prison to plead guilty or face the 
horrors of trial and a longer sentence.187 
As plea bargaining began to take hold, it attracted both supporters and 
critics.188 Plea bargaining concerned the Progressives because it was ripe for 
prosecutorial corruption and allowed criminals a “pass” from receiving 
punishment that actually corresponded to the seriousness of their crimes.189 
The Realists, however, regarded plea bargaining as a necessary way to 
efficiently deal with burgeoning caseloads, and they prevailed.190 Moreover, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. United States, which came 
down at a time when it was estimated that 90 to 95 percent of convictions 
were the result of pleas, assuaged Progressives’ concerns and adopted 
protections to ensure that guilty pleas were voluntary and not coerced.191 In 
Brady, the Court held that pleas were acceptable so long as the defendant had 
competent counsel, there were no threats or false promises made while 
 
 184 Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, Guilty Plea Courts: A Social Disciplinary Model 
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negotiating the plea, and the defendant made the plea “intelligently.”192 
However, the line between what is coerced and what is voluntary is blurry193 
and has not been applied in a racially-neutral way. 
In fact, a closer look at state and U.S. Supreme Court decisions shows 
that courts historically demeaned African American defendants and regarded 
them as “ignorant negroes” to justify providing African Americans with 
procedural justice protections during and after the 1960s.194 For example, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, which recognized a 
defendant’s right to counsel in felony criminal cases, did not help African 
Americans combat the institutional racism that denied them equal justice 
under the law.195 A lawyer was not sufficient protection to help African 
American defendants overcome their lack of an affluent family, social 
network, and credible witnesses—all of which are societal privileges that 
help defend against criminal charges and avoid conviction.196 
From the 1970s onward, the U.S. criminal justice system established 
plea bargaining as vital because efficiency became a priority at the expense 
of rights.197 McConville and Mirsky posited that plea bargaining’s usefulness 
was that it was a socially acceptable way of “imposing control and discipline” 
on those “highly visible sections of society, those who are perceived as 
dangerous because of their lack of involvement in an acceptable labor market 
and the intensity of their involvement with the criminal justice system.”198 
Under this model, the police are proactive, rather than reactive, using 
surveillance and sweeps to target people of color.199 All the legal actors 
understand that there is a presumption of guilt.200 Defense lawyers may not 
interview witnesses or conduct further negotiations if the system presumes 
their client is guilty.201 “Subordination and degradation” were the tools used 
to convince defendants to plead guilty.202 
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By the 1990s, certain scholars characterized the U.S. criminal justice 
system “a steroid era in criminal justice.”203 When Congress adopted 
mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines, it made plea 
bargaining an even more attractive option.204 Today, plea bargaining is the 
criminal justice system for many, with little constraint or oversight. Three 
recent Supreme Court cases cast a crumb of hope that the Court recognizes 
the need for court guidance on plea bargaining.205 Yet, as we saw with 
Gideon and other laws and decisions, these decisions will not help African 
American defendants claim their justice rights if these decisions are applied 
in a racially biased way. 
II. THE PERPETUATION OF IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN PLEA BARGAINING 
TODAY 
This Section discusses how the United States’ historical legacy of racial 
discrimination has formed our implicit biases about African Americans and 
fuels the presumption of guilt in plea bargaining practice today. Even though 
some consider implicit biases less blameworthy because they are 
unconscious, implicit biases still have a pernicious impact on justice 
outcomes. In this discussion, the author will explain how the plea-bargaining 
process, as it operates today, allows the racialized presumption of guilt to 
emerge and adversely shape the justice outcomes of African American male 
defendants. Three conditions of the negotiating process prime the emergence 
of implicit bias: the negotiation process’s speed; the prosecutors’ and defense 
attorneys’ unawareness about their own implicit biases against African 
American male defendants; and defendants’ and prosecutors’ discretion in 
deciding the justice outcome. 
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A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS 206 
When an African American man gets arrested, the district attorney’s 
office then has to decide whether to charge him, and if so, with what 
offense.207 The prosecutor on the case will make this decision, in large part, 
based on the information the arresting officer gives the prosecutor.208 Among 
the country’s many district attorneys’ offices, the rules and procedures about 
whether to charge a defendant are not uniform, and, if the accused is charged, 
the rules about deciding what charges are appropriate are not uniform 
either.209 In some offices, the case prosecutor alone will make the decision 
within twenty-four hours.210 In other offices, the case prosecutor will consult 
with a supervisor about what, if any, charges are appropriate.211 If the 
prosecutor decides to charge the accused, the accused has a right to be 
represented by a lawyer. 
Once a prosecutor brings charges, the defense attorney and prosecutor 
usually have an opportunity to plea bargain.212 Prior to the plea-bargaining 
meeting, the defense attorney is likely to meet with her client to gather 
information about what, if anything, happened and to understand her client’s 
 
 206 Please note that there is a paucity of law controlling the “rules” and “practices” of plea 
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goals.213 The meeting may take place in the defense attorney’s office, in jail, 
or in the courthouse when the client is brought to be arraigned. If the client 
is in jail, the attorney may have to navigate many security procedures that 
make it harder to meet with her client. This attorney–client meeting may be 
perfunctory; the two may review the client’s past criminal history, discuss 
what happened and any extenuating circumstances, and clarify the client’s 
goals.214 In rarer circumstances, the attorney–client meeting may involve a 
fuller understanding of the client as a human being, not just as a defendant, 
and might conduct a follow-up investigation of the facts learned from the 
client. It is likely that this client is one of many in an overflowing number of 
cases the defense attorney is responsible for managing.215 Adding to the 
defense attorney’s challenges of preparing for plea bargaining, she may not 
have access to the same information as the prosecutor.216 
Prior to the plea-bargaining meeting between the attorneys, the 
prosecutor will have information from the arresting officer or officers about 
the alleged reason for the defendant’s arrest. The prosecutor will also have 
information available about the defendant’s prior criminal history, if any 
exists. When reviewing this information and assessing what, if any, charges 
will be brought, the prosecutor will likely be guided by whatever the 
prevailing rules, procedures, and politics are within the district attorney’s 
office in which they work. It is also likely that this will be one of many cases 
in an overflowing caseload that the prosecutor must manage. 
Based on this limited information and the other caseload demands, the 
prosecutor is compelled to make a snap judgment about whether or not this 
case is likely winnable at trial and what are the acceptable parameters of any 
plea bargain. 
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Defense attorneys and prosecutors usually engage in plea bargaining 
with this limited information and no other preparation.217 District attorneys 
have an obligation to share exculpatory evidence with the defense.218 But, in 
some district attorney’s offices, there is disagreement about what evidence is 
exculpatory and what is not. This gives the prosecutor an advantage during 
plea bargaining because of the asymmetry of available information to each 
side.219 Recently, there has been a movement to require prosecutors to share 
all evidence—not just exculpatory evidence—related to the case with 
defense attorneys.220 Although some district attorneys, like Eric Gonzalez in 
the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office, require that good practice and 
transparency mandates that evidence be shared, this practice is not the 
norm.221 
The defense attorney is usually the one who initiates the meeting, even 
though the prosecutor may do so, too.222 It is not uncommon for the plea 
negotiation to be an impromptu meeting in a corner of the courtroom or a 
hallway or during an impromptu phone call and to last under five minutes.223 
During this brief negotiation, the conversation between the prosecutor and 
defense attorney is usually dominated by charges, proposals for counter 
charges, and disposition options. When the negotiation concludes, either after 
the meeting or after the defense attorney has followed-up and consulted with 
her client, there is a strong likelihood that the defendant will accept the plea 
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and a justice agreement will be reached. After all, approximately 97 percent 
of federal cases are resolved by plea bargaining.224 
Even if the African American male defendant is innocent, he may opt 
to plead guilty.225 In cases where the prosecution charges the defendant with 
a misdemeanor, he may plead guilty to just get out of court and resume his 
life.226 However, pleading to a misdemeanor, even though this may appear 
to be a realistic option under the circumstances, may come at a high cost.227 
In the event the defendant is arrested again and tries to plea bargain a justice 
resolution, the original misdemeanor plea may be viewed as a strike against 
him in this contemporary plea bargain.228 Prosecutors will likely charge him 
with more serious crimes and, ultimately, offer him a harsher sentence.229 
If he is innocent and prosecutors charge him with a felony, the defendant 
may still opt to plead guilty and forego constitutional protections offered by 
a jury trial. The defendant may fear the possibility of a higher post-trial 
sentence and may agree to the lower sentence prosecutors offered during the 
plea bargain.230 Moreover, the prosecutor knows how to exercise 
discretionary powers to intimidate the defendant about the dire consequences 
 
 224 Id. 
 225 See, e.g., THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 17 (“[A]nywhere from 1.6% to 27% 
of defendants who plead guilty may be factually innocent.”); Spohn, supra note 38, at 49; 
Rakoff, supra note 43 (estimating that approximately 20,000 are in prison for pleading guilty 
for crimes they did not commit); TRUE JUSTICE DOCUMENTARY, supra note 117; MALCOLM M. 
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS PUNISHMENT (1979) (explaining why the court process itself is a form 
of punishment that compels some defendants to plea); STUNTZ, supra note 12 (discussing how 
innocent persons who are charged with misdemeanors are unfairly treated in the criminal 
justice system and compelled to plead guilty without awareness of the long-term consequences 
of such pleas); Crespo, supra note 58, at 1306; Yoffe, supra note 4; ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, 
MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (documenting how the broken windows policy was actually a form 
of social control because those accused of low-level crimes were deprived of procedural 
justice and punished with the life-long consequences of being branded a criminal). 
 226 KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 225, at 245; ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT 
WITHOUT CRIME 78 (2018); FEELEY, supra note 225. 
 227 See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, supra note 226, at 78 (2018) (discussing how the 
misdemeanor system compels innocent defendants to plead guilty and deprives those pleading 
to a misdemeanor of knowing the long-term consequences); see also NYCLA Justice Center 
Task Force Report, supra note 43 (highlighting the reasons why innocent defendants plead 
guilty and suggesting reforms to minimize the likelihood that innocent defendants will plead 
guilty); Ronald F. Wright, Jenny Roberts & Betina Wilkinson, The Shadow Bargainers, 
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3
577322.\ (discussing how little time is spent on the plea-bargaining process). 
 228 NATAPOFF, supra note 226, at 78; NYCLA Justice Center Task Force Report, supra 
note 43. 
 229 Id. 
 230 THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 17. 
124 GREENBERG [Vol. 111 
that will result if the defendant does not accept a guilty plea. First, the 
prosecutor is likely to preview the defendant’s fate if he turns down the plea 
bargain, piling on charges and concomitant sentences and overreaching when 
interpreting the facts to the law.231 Then the prosecutor will “slide down” to 
an offer that more realistically fits the alleged facts and is likely to incentivize 
the defendant to plead guilty, even if the defendant is factually innocent.232 
If the African American male defendant is guilty of a crime, the deal his 
attorney negotiates for him in plea bargaining is likely to be less favorable 
than the plea bargain of a white male defendant for a similar crime.233 
Prosecutors will initially charge him with more serious crimes, make fewer 
concessions during the plea bargain, and ultimately cause the judge to 
sentence him to longer prison time than a similarly situated white 
defendant.234 
As explained below, the existing plea-bargaining process allows the 
implicit biases of defense attorneys and prosecutors to emerge and shape the 
plea-bargaining process. The speed of the process, the unawareness of or lack 
of acknowledgment about the legal actors’ own biases, and the discretion of 
prosecutors and defense attorneys all contribute to the negative outcomes for 
African American male defendants. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF PLEA BARGAINING PRIME RACIALIZED 
JUSTICE OUTCOMES 
When we step back to examine the plea-bargaining process, it is not 
surprising that the implicit racial biases of both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys taint the justice outcomes for African American male defendants. 
The discussion continues by explaining how the nature of implicit biases, the 
speed of the plea-bargaining process, and the unfettered discretion of 
prosecutors prime racialized justice outcomes. 
 
 231 Crespo, supra note 58, at 1315 (discussing prosecutorial discretion and raising whether 
subconstitutional procedural reforms could be employed to moderate such discretion). 
 232 See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 12 (explaining that guilty pleas, and the bargaining that 
leads to them, are largely invisible and that guilty pleas and quick bargains have become the 
system’s primary means of judging a defendants’ guilt or innocence); Spohn, supra note 38 
(calling for an overhaul of the sentencing system including the “trial penalty”); THE TRIAL 
PENALTY, supra note 40, at 15 (explaining that fewer than 3% of criminal defendants exercise 
their Sixth Amendment right to trial because the prosecutor has threatened them with the “trial 
penalty” if the defendant refuses the prosecutor’s plea bargaining offer and proceeds to trial). 
 233 See, e.g., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31, at 1142–46 (discussing how 
implicit racial bias contaminates the criminal legal system). 
 234 Id. at 1146–52. 
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1. Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Fail to Own Their Implicit Biases— 
Unaware, Unacknowledged, Unexamined 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys have an ethical obligation to 
acknowledge and manage their own racial biases.235 Even though social 
science research indicates that we all have implicit biases, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys—even African American prosecutors and defense 
attorneys236—are often unaware of their own implicit biases towards African 
 
 235 See, e.g., CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2017) [hereinafter ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION], 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEditi
on/ [https://perma.cc/T7AJ-WF77]. Standard 3-1.6 Improper Bias Prohibited provides: 
(a) The prosecutor should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice 
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or socioeconomic status. A prosecutor should not use other improper 
considerations, such as partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion. A prosecutor should strive to eliminate implicit biases, and act to 
mitigate any improper bias or prejudice when credibly informed that it exists within the 
scope of the prosecutor’s authority. 
(b) A prosecutor’s office should be proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and eliminate 
improper biases, with particular attention to historically persistent biases like race, in all of 
its work. A prosecutor’s office should regularly assess the potential for biased or unfairly 
disparate impacts of its policies on communities within the prosecutor’s jurisdiction and 
eliminate those impacts that cannot be properly justified. 
The ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function Standard 4-1.6 Improper Bias 
Prohibited provides: 
(a) Defense counsel should not manifest or exercise, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice 
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or socioeconomic status. Defense counsel should strive to eliminate implicit 
biases, and act to mitigate any improper bias or prejudice when credibly informed that it 
exists within the scope of defense counsel’s authority. 
(b) Defense counsel should be proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and eliminate 
improper biases, with particular attention to historically persistent biases like race, in all of 
counsel’s work. A public defense office should regularly assess the potential for biased or 
unfairly disparate impacts of its policies on communities within the defense office’s 
jurisdiction, and eliminate those impacts that cannot be properly justified. 
CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION, (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) [hereinafter ABA 
CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION], https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crim
inal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/ [https://perma.cc/FX6G-RYZJ]. 
 236 See, e.g., Luca Guido Valla & Davide Rivolta, Stereotypical Biases in Black People 
Toward Black People, SOC’Y FOR PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. (Mar. 28, 2019), 
http://www.spsp.org/news-center/blog/valla-rivolta-biases [https://perma.cc/A7SW-5SGX]; 
see also Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t We 
All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 359–61 (2015); Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, 
Charles M. Judd, & Bern Wittenbrink, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1314, 
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American male defendants.237 Many prosecutors and defense attorneys 
choose to pursue legal careers in the criminal justice system “to do 
justice.”238 How could they be racially biased? Even though these legal actors 
may understand that everyone has implicit biases, they may be more 
defensive about acknowledging that they have implicit biases against African 
American male defendants. 
Sociologist Robin DiAngelo explains that white people are 
uncomfortable admitting that they are racist even though everybody is 
racist.239 After all, the term “racist” connotes that the person is bad, and “not 
racist” connotes the person is good.240 Anti-racist educator Ibram X. Kendi 
educates that African Americans can be racist, too, because they struggle 
with a “dueling consciousness” between wanting to assimilate into the 
broader white culture, while still striving to be anti-racist.241 Cognitive 
behavioral psychologists have opened up the conversation by differentiating 
between explicit and implicit biases.242 If it is unconscious, it is “not my 
fault.” DiAngelo further clarifies that racism is more complicated, and it is 
not uncommon for individuals to resist examining the benefits that have 
inured to them just from being white.243 Those who have white identity may 
unconsciously absorb the stereotypical values of a white collective society 
that has based their white identity on viewing Black people as inferior.244 
Rather than acknowledging the moral trauma and guilt that comes with 
examining the physical and psychological subjugation the white collective245 
has inflicted on African Americans, the white collective projects onto 
African Americans these dehumanizing behaviors that the  the white 
collective has historically inflicted on them and then blames African 
 
1325 (2002) (detailing a video game study that demonstrates greater proclivity of both white 
and black participants to shoot black faces); FORMAN, supra note 12 (explaining how both 
black and white people developed and enforced racially discriminatory criminal policies). 
 237 See, e.g., Adachi, supra note 55; Andrea D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of 
Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755, 760 (2012); Smith 
& Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias supra note 5, at 802. 
 238 Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 187 (2007) (prosecutors take great pride in viewing themselves as 
“ministers of justice”); Adachi, supra note 55. 
 239 DIANGELO, supra note 60, at 73. 
 240 Id. at 72. 
 241 KENDI, supra note 59 (explaining how the desire to assimilate is racist because it 
perpetuates a bias about those blacks who are not assimilated). 
 242 See, e.g., BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 7; KAHNEMAN, supra note 8. 
 243 See, e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 73. 
 244 Id. at 122. 
 245 The term “white collective” refers to a perspective of how white people as a group 
have benefitted from systemic racism. 
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Americans for the white collective’s racism.246 Such projection manifests 
itself in the way we punish African Americans,247 the way we mass 
incarcerate them,248 and the way we execute them.249 
Of course, there are enlightened prosecutors and defense attorneys who 
have acknowledged their implicit biases.250 That is an important first step, 
but more needs to be done. As DiAngelo explains, white people need to 
examine not only their individual responsibility, but also the many ways the 
perpetuation of white dominance—including through the subjugation of 
Black people—continues to allow racial discrimination in our world and in 
plea bargaining.251 Society must recognize that defenses such as, “I have 
Black friends,” or, “I was in the Peace Corps,” are unhelpful rationalizations  
that prevent them from beginning to engage in a more racially-neutral manner 
that is less influenced by their implicit biases.252 Only when white people 
acknowledge how they benefit from the status quo and take full responsibility 
for their contributions to maintain the status quo can real reform take place. 
2. Speed 
The speed of the plea-bargaining process itself makes it more likely that 
the implicit biases towards African American men will emerge. Daniel 
Kahneman explains we think in two ways: System 1, a faster, reactive 
process, and System 2, a more thoughtful process.253 System 1 thinking 
includes our implicit biases and stereotypes about African American male 
defendants.254 When we rush to judgment, as in plea negotiations, more often 
than not, our System 1 thinking will guide that decision making. To manage 
our implicit biases, Kahneman recommends that negotiators slow down the 
process so that negotiators will instead rely on System 2 information.255 
 
 246 DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 91. 
 247 FORMAN, supra note 12, at 218. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id.; see also Race and the Death Penalty, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/race-and-
death-penalty [https://perma.cc/X3EU-CW5X] (last visited Aug.17, 2020) (stating that a 
disproportionate number of imprisoned black people are executed). 
 250 As an example, Fair and Just Prosecution is a group of forward-thinking prosecutors 
dedicated to enhancing fairness in the justice system. See, e.g., 21 Principles for the 21st 
Century Prosecutor, FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION (2018), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/FJP_21Principles_Interactive-w-destinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WA77-N63P]. 
 251 DIANGELO, supra note 59, at 72–73. 
 252 Id. at 78. 
 253 KAHNEMAN, supra note 8, at 86. 
 254 Id. 
 255 See, e.g., id.; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 48, at 975. 
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Negotiation theory also teaches that effective negotiation requires 
preparation.256 Part of that preparation involves perspective-taking, including 
the management of the negotiator’s own biases.257 Once the negotiator has 
adequately prepared for the negotiation, effective negotiators also know the 
importance of scheduling the negotiation so that there is adequate time to 
have a meaningful conversation during which there is a thoughtful sharing of 
perspectives, an exchange of relevant information, and a common 
understanding.258 
The plea-bargaining process, however, is akin to justice proceedings on 
steroids.259 There may be little preparation prior to the meeting.260 This 
leaves the legal actors little time to acknowledge and manage their own 
implicit biases about the defendant and get to know the defendant as a human 
being.261 Who is the defendant? What are the extenuating circumstances? 
How credible are the witnesses? How reliable is the evidence? These are the 
types of questions that do not get answered even though they should, because 
implicit racial biases obscure the truth. 
Two of the more important questions above left unanswered by this lack 
of preparation are what does the evidence objectively show, and how reliable 
are the witnesses.262 As stated earlier, African Americans are more likely 
than whites to be profiled as criminals and arrested on a biased hunch.263 
Prior to charging a defendant, and again during the preparation to plea 
bargain, prosecutors have a unique opportunity to assess this information and 
decline to go forward with the case if the police based the arrest on racial bias 
and not merit.264 Without taking the time to assess the accuracy of this 
arresting information, however, the prosecutors may unintentionally be 
putting the offices’ imprimatur on racially-biased information and further 
decreasing the likelihood that the African American male defendant will get 
an equitable justice resolution during plea bargaining. 
 
 256 See, e.g., WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO 15–16 (2007) (explaining that preparation 
is crucial to a successful negotiation). 
 257 See, e.g., id. at 52–75; FISHER & URY, supra note 67, at 24. 
 258 See, e.g., URY, supra note 256, at 48–50. 
 259 See ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME, supra note 207, at 212–16 (explaining 
how efficiency, and interest of plea bargaining, may lead to unfair justice outcomes). 
 260 Cf. id. at 215 (discussing methods of strong preparation for effective plea bargaining). 
 261 See, e.g., Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, at 2632; Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. 
Wright, Images and Allusions in Prosecutors’ Morality Tales, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 38 (2017); 
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31, at 1159. 
 262 Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 279–82 (2011). 
 263 See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 264 Sloan, supra note 50, at 10–12. 
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Plea bargaining, as it is practiced today, defies the tenets of good 
negotiation practice, ignores the guidance of cognitive behavioral 
psychologists, and allows the legal actors involved to be influenced by their 
implicit biases. Too often, the prosecutor and defense attorney may view the 
other as opponents, instead of negotiators with different perspectives, 
working toward a common goal, each seeking to do justice.265 Moreover, the 
prosecutor and defense attorney may each have their own racialized implicit 
bias about the defendant that shapes their perception of the defendant’s guilt, 
the plea offers, and the agreed-upon justice disposition.266 As noted above, 
with little or no preparation, the actual meeting, whether in-person or 
telephonic, may take less than five minutes. 
3. Discretion267 
The prosecutor has a large amount of discretion to decide whether or 
not to dismiss the case, what crimes to charge the defendant with, and the 
range of possible resolutions to consider. 268 “Discretionary justice too often 
amounts to discriminatory justice.”269 No one checks this prosecutorial 
discretion, and there are few office rules and little judicial oversight, too. As 
would be expected, this discretion allows a prosecutor’s implicit racial biases 
 
 265 Cf. ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 235, at 
3-1.2(b) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, 
not merely to convict.”); ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION, supra note 
235, at 4-1.2(b), (e)  (“The primary duties that defense counsel owe to their clients, to the 
administration of justice, and as officers of the court, are to serve as their clients’ counselor 
and advocate with courage and devotion: to ensure that constitutional and other legal rights of 
their clients are protected; and to render effective, high-quality legal representation with 
integrity . . . . Defense counsel should seek to reform and improve the administration of 
criminal justice.”). 
 266 See, e.g., Richardson & Goff, supra note 50, 2634–41; Sloan, supra note 50, at 22–26; 
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 31, at 1142; Maurice Chammah, Do Public 
Defenders Spend Less Time on Black Defendants?, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 2, 2016), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/05/02/do-public-defenders-spend-less-time-on-
black-clients [https://perma.cc/99EY-9V7H] (discussing how defense attorneys may be 
biased). 
 267 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 5 (“Discretionary justice too often amounts to discriminatory 
justice.”). 
 268 See, e.g., id.; Spohn, supra note 38, at 78; THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 7; 
Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 807 (stating that 
empirical research shows that Americans implicitly connect African Americans with 
aggression, hostility, guns, and weapons). 
 269 STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 5; see also Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown & 
Helena Lee, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1985) (discussing how the lack of structure and 
rules are more likely to allow prejudice to emerge). 
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to emerge. It colors how the prosecutor selectively processes the available 
evidence about the crime and the defendant and influences the prosecutor’s 
estimate about the success of securing a conviction at trial.270 
As one example, there is empirical research that shows that individuals 
are prone to favoring and empathizing with individuals like themselves.271 
This bias is known as “in-group favoritism.” This becomes evident when a 
white prosecutor is prone to be lenient to white defendants. However, when 
a white prosecutor makes an equivalent assessment of an African American 
man accused of a similar crime, and is thus assessing the African American 
man’s guilt, remorse and the appropriate plea to offer, there is no “in-group 
favoritism.” Instead, the prosecutor may be unconsciously influenced by 
implicit biases of African American men as hostile, aggressive, likely to use 
weapons, and prone to criminality.272 Unless there is oversight, rules, and 
procedures to check against such bias, it is likely that such racialized bias 
will contaminate the justice outcomes of plea bargaining. 
Thus, the process of plea bargaining allows the implicit racial biases of 
prosecutors and defense attorneys to emerge and shape unjust outcomes for 
African American male defendants. The status quo must change. The next 
Section prescribes organizational and individual affirmative steps 
prosecutors and defense attorneys can take to help racially debias plea 
bargaining. 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL PRESCRIPTIONS TO RACIALLY 
DEBIAS PLEA BARGAINING 
Readers may be wondering how such a racialized presumption of guilt 
could be allowed to continue for so long without criminal justice reformers 
intervening and demanding affirmative steps to ameliorate this bias.273 This 
Section takes those overdue steps and prescribes organizational and 
procedural debiasing strategies for district attorneys’ offices and public 
defenders’ offices and for the prosecutors and defense attorneys who actually 
conduct the plea bargaining. The suggested reforms will help contain the 
racialized implicit bias of prosecutors and defense attorneys by targeting the 
three conditions of plea bargaining that allow racialized implicit biases to 
emerge: the lack of self-awareness about one’s racialized implicit biases; the 
 
 270 Burke, supra note 238, at 196. 
 271 Smith & Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 5, at 816. 
 272 Id. at 818. 
 273 There has been a floodgate of recommendations to limit prosecutorial discretion in plea 
bargaining, increase judicial oversight of plea bargaining, and get rid of plea bargaining in its 
entirety. However, this author has been unable to locate any formal debiasing reforms for the 
plea bargaining process. 
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speed of the plea-bargaining process; and the unfettered discretion of 
prosecutors. These prescriptions build on the growing support for prosecutors 
and defendants to work together for better justice outcomes274 and culls from 
the existing debiasing research.275 Combined, the recommendations will: 
provide legal actors involved in plea bargaining with the skills to manage 
their racialized implicit biases; establish a more deliberative plea bargaining 
process in which parties share objective information to minimize the reactive 
decision making that evokes implicit racial bias; and help implement 
procedural safeguards to check the prosecutorial discretion that may be 
racially applied. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL DEBIASING REFORMS: WHAT THE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEYS’ AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS’ OFFICES CAN DO 
Dispute system design specialists teach us that when organizations are 
implementing a new goal, the organization should also enact rules, 
procedures, and supporting structures that will help achieve that goal. 276 
Thus, those district attorneys’ and public defenders’ offices that are 
committed to unshackling implicit and explicit racism from plea bargaining 
can begin by first voicing this policy goal. Then the organizations’ directors 
should reinforce that policy goal with an organizational structure, rules, and 
procedures that align and support the goal of minimizing the racialized 
presumption of guilt in plea bargaining. The following are specific 
suggestions about how organizations may make racial debiasing an 
organization goal, operationalize that goal with specific strategies, and 
measure the success of the organization’s racial debiasing efforts.277 
 
 274 See, e.g., THE TRIAL PENALTY, supra note 40, at 3 (calling for the end of the trial 
penalty as a threat to coerce criminal defendants into accepting pleas); Eppes, supra note 46 
(explaining how the task of preventing innocent defendants from pleading guilty was 
comprised of prosecutors, public defense attorneys, and judges); FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, 
supra note 46 (discussing public prosecutors who wish to work together to develop 
innovations that will promote better justice outcomes). 
 275 See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel & James H. Stark, Improving Lawyers’ Judgment: Is 
Mediation Training De-Biasing?, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015); Christopher T. Stein 
& Michelle Drouin, Cognitive Bias in the Courtroom: Combating the Anchoring Effect 
Through Tactical Debiasing, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 393 (2018); Robert J. Smith, Justin D. 
Levinson & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. 
L. REV. 871, 903 (2015). 
 276 See Smith & Martinez, supra note 45, at 129–33. 
 277 The goal is to mitigate racially disparate outcomes. Thus, African American male 
defendants who are guilty should not get harsher punishments than similarly situated white 
defendants. Moreover, those African American male defendants who are factually innocent 
should have their charges dropped as part of the plea bargain, similar to those similarly situated 
white defendants. 
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Make race debiasing an organizational goal. Explicitly state in your 
employee manuals that delivering justice for all means justice without any 
racialized presumptions of guilt. 
 
Some readers may be scratching their heads and saying, “Duh! Of 
course we don’t support racialized justice.” There is value in stating the 
obvious.278 Take the extra step and identify debiased justice as a priority to 
help make all legal actors aware that deracialized justice is an office priority 
that is front and center in delivering justice. 
 
Each organization should develop an operational plan that identifies 
measurable goals with specific action steps to achieve those goals.279
 
Now that debiasing the racialized presumption of guilt is a priority, each 
organization needs to operationalize that goal and detail how this plan will 
be executed during the everyday workings of the office. This involves 
identifying the specific steps that must be taken, when to expect to achieve 
measurable results, and how those results will be measured. 
 
Organizations should create a unified organizational structure, 
organizational culture, and office policies that provide attorneys with 
adequate time and reinforcement to prepare, conduct, and debrief about plea 
bargaining. This allows attorneys to defend against their own and their 
counterpart’s racialized bias. 
 
Adequate preparation by the attorney should include time to fully 
interview, investigate, and assess the evidence’s relative strength to defend 
against their own and their counterpart’s racialized bias. This 
recommendation presents a challenge for the already underfunded and under-
 
 278 Teresa Colón, The Value of Stating the Obvious, MEDIUM (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://medium.com/personal-growth/the-value-of-stating-the-obvious-e500451125fd 
[https://perma.cc/8LFQ-EBKH]. 
 279 See Operationalize Your Strategic Plan, PROF. GROWTH SYS., 
https://www.professionalgrowthsystems.com/org-culture/operationalize-strategic-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/GD8K-TB3C] (explaining how an organization’s goals need to be 
operationalized by having a specific day-to-day plan for how the goals will be executed and 
achieved); Operationalizing Goals for Action: A Planning Workbook, RIVERLAND CMTY. 
COLL., https://www.riverland.edu/about-riverland/office-of-the-president/documents-reports/
planning-workbook-operationalizing-goals-for-action/ [https://perma.cc/9DXU-YE4S] (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (containing a workbook for use as a guide for operationalizing an 
organizational plan of action). 
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resourced defense attorneys.280 However, the cost of effecting justice is well 
worth expending extra time and costs. Preparation prior to the plea 
bargaining allows the attorneys to gather and review information about the 
defendant and witnesses. Collecting this information, as well as assessing the 
evidence’s quality, will help mitigate racialized implicit bias. For the 
prosecutor, there should be adequate time to review police information, 
assess its accuracy, and ferret out any bias before the prosecutor relies on it. 
As stated earlier, police profiling is about stereotyping.281 The prosecutor 
should interview the victim to understand the victim’s true justice interest. 
The prosecutor should provide the defense attorney with access to all 
evidence. The defense attorney should investigate the case, talk to witnesses, 
and visit the scene of the alleged crime prior to plea bargaining to gather 
objective information that will help defend against implicit racialized bias. 
282 
Defense attorneys should have adequate time to interview the defendant 
and get to know him as a human being. Humanizing the defendant will help 
dispel the defense attorneys’ and prosecutors’ racialized biases by talking 
about the defendant as an individual, not a stereotype. If the defendant is in 
jail, it is challenging for some attorneys to access the defendant and conduct 
the interview. The organizational leaders could work together to make access 
easier. If the attorney is having a hard time relating to her client, that is a sign 
to pause and examine if the attorney’s implicit racialized biases are 
interfering with developing a workable attorney–client relationship. 
The office can develop procedures for humanizing and developing 
empathy for the client. During regular office meetings, discuss race in every 
case debrief. Create teams to provide a check against bias and that support 
debiasing any information that will be used in plea bargaining. During case 
preparation, plea negotiations, and case debriefs, encourage attorneys to 
humanize the client by including other facts beyond the crime allegedly 
committed. Have a picture of the defendant other than a mugshot to help view 
the client as an individual, not just one more case file. If the defendant does 
not have a photo, ask friends or family for one, or, as a last resort, the lawyer 
can take a photo of her own. 
For offices where each attorney has overflowing caseloads, the 
leadership needs to advocate for a more realistic budget that allows attorneys 
 
 280 Alkon, Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining, supra note 205, at 579–80. 
 281 See supra notes 26–39 and accompanying text. 
 282 Roberts & Wright, supra note 63, at 1465 (finding that defense attorneys prepare less 
for plea bargaining than for trial). 
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to have manageable caseloads so they can provide clients with justice.283 
Justice may not be cheap, but it is a legal imperative.284 Furthermore, it is a 
preferable moral and economical alternative to spend adequate time 
representing a client rather than locking up innocent people or punishing 
guilty people with unfair sentences.285 
 
Organize annual joint plea-bargaining trainings for prosecutors’ and 
defense attorneys’ offices that incorporate debiasing strategies to remove the 
racialized presumption of guilt. 
 
Now is the time to take the lead and fill in the gap of self-awareness 
about racial bias by providing plea-bargaining training that helps prosecutors 
and defense attorneys address their racialized presumption of guilt and 
approach plea bargaining in a more racially-neutral stance.286 Existing 
training and scholarship on plea bargaining focuses on the cognitive biases 
of prosecutors and defense attorneys, but not the implicit racialized bias.287 
This gap defies logic since an overwhelming critique of the system is about 
the racialized justice results!288 Moreover, prosecutors and defense attorneys 
 
 283 Cf. Steve Cohen, The Lasting Legacy of a Case that Was “Lost,” 119 PA. STATE L. 
REV. 1 (2014) (detailing the legacy of the “Libby Zion” law in New York, adjusting the hours 
and supervisory requirements of residents and interns in hospitals following the death of an 
eighteen-year-old patient); see also M. Eve Hanan, Big Law, Public Defender-Style: 
Aggregating Resources to Ensure Uniform Quality of Representation, 74 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. ONLINE 420 (2018) (arguing that statewide public defender offices should restructure 
and pool financial and intellectual resources to provide more effective advocacy). 
 284 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (guaranteeing a criminal defendant’s 
right to effective counsel during the plea-bargaining process). 
 285 A 2015 study by the Vera Institute estimated that the annual “average cost per inmate” 
across the United States was $33,274. Prison Spending in 2015, VERA INST. JUST., 
https://www.vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-
prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prison-
spending [https://perma.cc/FC2G-Z72E] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). In New York, this 
number was estimated to be $69,355. Id. 
 286 See Roberts & Wright, supra note 63, at 1463 (noting a paucity of plea-bargaining 
training). 
 287 See, e.g., ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME, supra note 207. This textbook 
was the first comprehensive text on plea bargaining, but it does not address implicit and 
explicit racism in plea bargaining. 
 288 Compare id., with Mitchell & Caudy, supra note 12 (discussing how racial bias causes 
racial disparities in drug arrests); Kutateladze & Andiloro, supra note 12 (finding that racial 
disparities existed after case screenings based on alleged offenses and discretion exercised), 
Devers, supra note 12; STUNTZ, supra note 12, at 2; Goldstein & Schweber, supra note 18; 
Berdejó, supra note 5 (discussing racial disparities in plea bargaining outcomes between white 
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typically receive training within their own professional silos. The benefit of 
having prosecutors and defense attorneys take the training together, however, 
is that this allows each side to begin to share and understand each other’s 
perspectives, including each other’s racialized biases.289 
As a threshold impasse, most attendees will deny that they are biased. 
Therefore, any training needs to include a non-threatening component that 
will help the participants become aware of their own biases. In my plea-
bargaining training modules on implicit bias, I begin with pictures of 
convicted criminals, and I ask the group to guess the crime the individual 
committed. Of course, this exercise elicits implicit racialized biases. For 
many attendees, it is the first moment they become aware of their implicit 
biases. Another tool is to recommend that participants take the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), an online test that assesses implicit biases, in the 
privacy of their own home or office. This opens the door for attorneys to 
examine how racialized biases could infiltrate plea bargaining and make 
suggestions about how debiasing strategies can minimize this. For example, 
preparing for the plea bargaining by completing a plea-bargaining worksheet 
(see Appendix) helps create a more thoughtful and slower process to gather 
the information needed. The plea-bargaining simulations should be based on 
real-life situations that will help participants practice and reinforce debiasing 
skills 
These instructional meetings should range from a half day to a full day. 
Follow-up and tweaking of these debiasing skills can take place in bi-
monthly advanced training with practice simulations. As an added incentive, 
these exercises could qualify for continuing legal education credit. However, 
there is a caveat: Training cannot effectively change people unless there is 
 
and black defendants); Baldus, Pulaski, & Woodworth, supra note 29 (showing that murders 
of white victims are eleven times more likely to result in a death sentence than those committed 
by black defendants); Spohn, supra note 38 (calling for an overhaul of sentencing procedures 
to reduce racial disparities such as the elimination or severely restricted use of the death 
penalty and sentencing those convicted of non-serious crimes to diversion programs); Rehavi 
& Starr, supra note 44 (finding that the average sentences for black defendants in federal court 
were thirty-five months longer than for white defendants); see also Anna Roberts, 
(Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 
827, 827 (2012) (suggesting that jurors be educated about implicit bias during juror orientation 
to help identify implicit juror bias). 
 289 See Frenkel & Stark, supra note 275, at 34 (explaining how perspective-taking is a 
debiasing tool). 
136 GREENBERG [Vol. 111 
actual organizational follow-up with rules and procedures that support the 
goal of removing the racialized presumption of guilt.290 
 
Collect Data About the Plea-Bargaining Outcomes.  
 
It is helpful for each office to self-assess its justice outcomes.291 Data 
analytics is a useful tool to help each office evaluate if its organizational 
strategies were effective in minimizing racial disparities in justice 
outcomes.292 This way, based on the data, organizations can sufficiently 
answer questions like: were the plea-bargaining outcomes for similar crimes 
different if the defendant was African American or white? As with all data 
collections, the data answer some questions and raise others. How should an 
organization be held accountable if racial disparities in justice outcomes 
persist? If data is collected on individual prosecutors and defense attorneys, 
will these legal actors be penalized if they do not improve? These data are 
one more helpful measure for organizations to reinforce what is working 
while also reassessing the additional training and procedural needs of each 
office. 
 
Hold conferences that include both state and federal legal actors 
involved with plea bargaining. 
 
There has been a rigid, artificial line between state and federal legal 
actors involved with plea bargaining that should be removed to address the 
racialized presumption of guilt. State and federal legal actors involved with 
plea bargaining are often unaware of the policies and procedures each office 
uses to ensure justice outcomes.293 Moreover, there is a patchwork of 
different rules and procedures among district attorneys’ offices and public 
defenders’ offices within the same state. Adding to the variations in plea 
 
 290 See, e.g., Briefing on Racial Disparities and Prosecutorial Practices in the 
Connecticut Criminal Justice System Before the Connecticut Advisory Committee of the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights 4 n.11 (Apr. 2, 2019), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/FJP-Komar-Statement-Final-7.2.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDL4-
BKVF] [hereinafter Komar Briefing] (statement of Liz Komar) (citing a 2018 study from the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission reporting on the limits on implicit bias training). 
 291 See Schneider & Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark, supra note 63( (data helps disclose 
racially disparate justice outcomes); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 
103 MINN. L. REV. 303 (2018); Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to 
Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 511 (2018). 
 292 Komar Briefing, supra note 290, at 5. 
 293 See, e.g., Elayne E. Greenberg, Adding Value to Conversations about Criminal 
Reform, A.B.A. DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (2020). 
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bargaining, the federal system has an entirely different plea-bargaining 
system from state systems.294 There is minimal opportunity for the attorneys 
in the different offices and systems to convene and learn from each other. 
However, if the different groups met, legal actors may welcome the treasure 
trove of ideas from each office.295 Let’s turn to the steps that individual 
prosecutors and defense attorneys should take to help racially debias the way 
the conduct plea bargains. 
B. PROCEDURAL DEBIASING STRATEGIES FOR INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS AND PROSECUTORS TO USE NOW 
While public defenders’ offices and district attorneys are reorganizing, 
there are more immediate steps individuals can take to prepare for their next 
plea bargain. 
 
Become aware of your own racialized implicit biases. 
 
Take the IAT at: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html. 
Through this lens, individuals should consider the other racialized judgments 
they may have made when they were representing an African American male 
client during plea bargaining because of implicit bias. 
Use debiasing techniques when preparing for the next plea bargain. 
For defense attorneys, when interviewing a client, get to know him as a 
human being.296 How easy it is to treat the defendant as one more case, when 
there are an overwhelming number of cases to manage. Defense attorneys 
should thoroughly investigate, as if preparing for trial, to get objective 
information to help debias.297 This objective information will slow attorneys 
down and promote a more deliberative process. 
Defense attorneys can use a checklist tool as a procedural safeguard 
with questions that ask if attorneys would handle the case differently if the 
client was a different race.298 For prosecutors, this is an opportunity to review 
 
 294 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (outlining procedures to enter and proceed with plea 
negotiations and agreements). 
 295 I was a member of the NY plea bargaining task force in which the members included 
legal actors from state and federal courts. During the ensuing conversations, the state legal 
actors were surprised to learn about the more deliberative process that goes on in federal court 
before a suspect is charged. The state actors then began to consider how they too could create 
a more deliberative process before a decision is made to charge a suspect. 
 296 See, e.g., Adachi, supra note 55 (discussing an example in which a defense lawyer 
learned more about her client and his family, which helped her humanize her client). 
 297 Roberts & Wright, supra note 63, at 1465. 
 298 Adachi, supra note 55. 
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the arrest information with a cautious eye that understands how the racialized 
implicit biases of police, de facto policies of racial profiling, and rapid 
decisions to charge increase the likelihood that the information relied upon 
is biased. Similar to their defense colleagues, prosecutors can develop their 
own checklist to question whether they would handle the case differently if 
the defendant was a different race. Both defense attorneys and prosecutors 
could find a motivated colleague in the office who can serve as another check 
on whether an attorney’s advocacy is tinged with racialized bias.299 This 
colleague can then also join in the systemic efforts to check racial bias in plea 
bargaining. Thus, individual attorneys can enlist their colleagues to help 
debias individual’s and office efforts to help make plea bargaining a more 




Both prosecutors and defense attorneys may find that empathizing with 
African American male defendants is another antidote that buffers the toxic 
effects of racialized implicit bias in plea bargaining.300 Empathy is a 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral process in which the person puts 
themselves in the other’s shoes.301 When we empathize, we slow our thought 
process down and shift from a reactive process to a more deliberative one.302 
In this more deliberative stance, we are likely to see the humanity of the other 
person, rather than viewing them through a distorted, biased lens.303 Not only 
does the recipient of empathy benefit, but the empathizer does, too. Empathy 
reduces the cognitive dissonance prosecutors and defense attorneys 
experience by creating more consistency between their explicit 
nondiscriminatory intent and their implicit biases.304 
 
Plea-Bargaining Worksheet—Humanize the client (See Appendix A). 
 
 
 299 Id. 
 300 See, e.g., Elayne E. Greenberg, Bridging Our Justice Gap with Empathetic Processes 
that Change Hearts, Expand Minds About Implicit Discrimination, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 441, 441 (2017). Even though individuals have different capacities to empathize, an 
individual can learn to expand their ability to empathize. However, empathy is not an 
unlimited resource. At times, a person may intentionally withhold empathy as a protective 
measure to preserve their own emotional well-being. Id. at 453–62. 
 301 Id. at 454. 
 302 Id. at 453. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. 
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The plea-bargaining worksheet is an essential prerequisite to debiasing 
plea bargaining. It provides prosecution and defense colleagues with an 
opportunity to slow down the process and engage in a more thoughtful 
inquiry about what, based on the particular client, is the most equitable way 
to resolve this matter. The worksheet requires the attorneys to provide, share, 
and question information based on objective rationales towards seeking 
justice. Moreover, the worksheet engages attorneys to give thought to 
multiple justice options rather than just horse-trading charges and 
concessions. 
 
Schedule the Plea Bargaining. 
 
If an individual is serious about debiasing plea bargaining, the plea-
bargaining negotiations need to be moved from congested courthouse 
corridors to a quiet meeting place where a respectful focus can be devoted to 
negotiating justice. Furthermore, it needs to be scheduled for a time when 
both prosecutors and defense attorneys have adequate time to prepare. And 
don’t forget to bring coffee! Bringing coffee or other refreshments helps set 
the tone to have a thoughtful negotiation during which parties can share 
information, question one another, and appreciate the high stakes of 
justice.305 
 
During the plea bargaining, share information and talk about the client 
as a human being. Don’t just horse trade charges. Decide, for this client, 
what an equitable justice outcome is. 
 
If prosecution and defense attorneys have adequately prepared for the 
plea negotiation, the ensuing negotiation should be a conversation during 
which the parties share information and problem-solve to seek an equitable 
justice outcome. In this slower, more deliberative process there is an 
opportunity to explicitly address concerns about implicit bias. Respectful 
 
 305 Prosecutors and defense attorneys, both essential legal actors in our justice system, 
may view their justice contributions differently. According to the ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards for the Prosecution Function, prosecutors “seek justice within the bounds of law, 
not merely to convict.” ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra 
note 235, at 3-1.2(b). The ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function explicitly 
provide that “[t]he primary duties that defense counsel owe to their clients, to the 
administration of justice, and as officers of the court, are to serve as their clients’ counselor 
and advocate with courage and devotion; to ensure that constitutional and other legal rights of 
their clients are protected; and to render effective, high-quality legal representation with 
integrity.” ABA CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION, supra note 235, at 4-1.2(b). 
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questioning by the defense attorney to the prosecutor about whether the 
prosecutor is likely to make similar offers and concessions if the defendant 
was white helps remind the prosecutor that prosecutorial discretion should 
not be influenced by race. Parties should refer to the plea-bargaining 
worksheet as a helpful guide to ensure that both parties share and process the 
important information that is relevant in coming to an appropriate resolution. 
The defendant’s picture, other than a mugshot, will help humanize the client 
and debias the racialized implicit biases that both defense attorneys and 
prosecutors may have about the defendant. 
 
Counseling the Client. 
 
Before an attorney counsels a client, the attorney must decide what is 
the relevant information to gather, and what are the appropriate options for 
the client. Counseling a client involves ambiguity and discretion, conditions 
that allow racial implicit biases to emerge. Therefore, when a defense 
attorney counsels an African American male defendant, the attorney must 
ensure that the attorney’s own racial biases about the defendant do not 
compromise the quality of guidance the attorney provides. Defense attorneys 
can check these biases by engaging in more mindful counseling.306 What are 
acceptable plea offers for this defendant? What are the full ramifications of 
accepting a plea, not only for the present legal matter, but for the remainder 
of the defendant’s life? Is the defense attorney counseling the African 
American male defendant in the same way the attorney would counsel a 
similarly situated white defendant? The answers to these questions will assist 
defense attorneys when they reevaluate whether the way they counsel 
African American male defendants is shaped by the defense attorney’s 
implicit racial biases. 
C. YES, BUT . . . 
Each of the organizational and individual debiasing prescriptions 
described above, although a step forward, will not unshackle the racial biases 
from plea bargaining. Rather, they provide an opportunity for legal actors to 
become aware of how their racialized biases affect the plea-bargaining 
process and the justice outcomes for African American male defendants. This 
is an ongoing examination, and hopefully as more recommended suggestions 
 
 306 Adam Lueke & Bryan Gibson, Mindfulness Meditation Reduces Implicit Age and Race 
Bias: The Role of Reduced Automaticity of Responding, 6 J. SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 
284, 284 (2014) (discussing how mindful meditation helps reduce implicit age and race bias). 
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become a regular part of plea-bargaining practice, they will help to create a 
culture of change. 
Still, some may point to other debiasing reforms that have scrubbed the 
racial identity of the defendant to ensure a fairer justice outcome.307 True, 
scrubbing the identity of African American male defendants accused of 
minor traffic violations yields more equal justice outcomes. However, in 
cases that involve plea bargaining, it is imperative that the legal actors 
accurately appreciate the defendant’s humanity. Scrubbing the racial identity 
of that African American defendant obscures that humanity and perpetuates 
the deep-rooted racial bias towards African American males in the criminal 
justice system writ large. 
Others have read the proposals, agreed that they are likely effective, but 
qualified their endorsement: “. . . but it will require more money.” How 
sobering! Are some willing to maintain the status quo of racialized justice 
because it is more affordable to maintain the status quo? This author posits 
that the humanity of all demands justice for all. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article chronicles racial discrimination’s deep historical roots in 
American society and criminal justice system and explains how this 
discrimination continues to shape the racialized presumption of guilt in plea 
bargaining. The Article then prescribes structural and procedural debiasing 
reforms that build on implicit bias and anti-racist scholarship. The purpose is 
to motivate us to get past our personal defenses and comfort zone about race 
and compel us to take more meaningful action. District attorneys’ offices, 
public defenders’ organizations, and the prosecutors and defense attorneys 
who work within these organizations are the primary legal actors who control 
plea bargaining. They are also the legal actors who have the power to become 
legal change agents within their plea-bargaining sphere of influence. 
“[T]o bring about change, [you] must not be afraid to take the first 
step . . . . [T]he only failure is failing to try.”308 We can begin to mitigate this 
 
 307 See, e.g., Sunita Sah, Christopher T. Robertson, & Shima B. Baughman, Blinding 
Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce Unconscious Bias in the 
Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 69 (2015); Evan Sernoffsky, SF DA 
Gascón Launching Tool to Remove Race When Deciding to Charge Suspects, S.F. CHRONICLE 
(June 12, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/SF-DA-Gasc-n-launching-tool-
to-remove-race-when-13971721.php [https://perma.cc/SQ89-H6MN] (introducing a world-
first application of artificial intelligence to “scrub” information from police reports that would 
be suggestive of a person’s race). 
 308 ROSA PARKS & GREGORY J. REED, DEAR MRS. PARKS: A DIALOGUE WITH TODAY’S 
YOUTH 97 (1996). 
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racialized presumption of guilt against African American male defendants 
today. Individual prosecutors and defense attorneys can begin to implement 
some of these suggestions immediately in their next plea bargain. District 
attorneys’ offices and public defenders’ organizations can begin announcing 
today that mitigating the racialized presumption of guilt is an organizational 
priority. They can then affirmatively take the steps necessary to reinforce that 
priority. Colleagues who are purveyors of justice in their writings, teachings, 
social activism, spirituality, personal living, and political support can use 
their sphere of influence to call attention to this racial injustice and help 
galvanize debiasing reform. 
Still, some readers may believe that, given the depth and amount of time 
that racism has persisted, racism is an intractable scorn that is part of our 
human condition. Others, like this author, however, reject the status quo as 
intolerable and optimistically believe reform is achievable. No country 
should take pride in promises of democracy and “justice for all” while 
supporting a presumption of guilt towards its African American male 
defendants that taints the negotiated justice process. “History, despite its 
wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, [but] if faced with courage, need not be 
lived again.”309 
 
APPENDIX: PLEA-BARGAINING WORKSHEET 
 
I. Name and contact information of the individual who is accused. 
Please include the name the individual prefers to be called. 
 
 
II. Tell more about the individual: Humanize the person (age, gender, 
education, family background, employment history). Please include a photo. 
 
 




IV. Is the person on probation or parole? Number of times checked 
in? Overall compliance? Relationship with parole officer? 
 
 309 ANGELOU, supra note 1. 
 
2021] UNSHACKLING PLEA BARGAINING 143 
 
 








VII. Are there any identifiable political or social factors that may 




VIII. Please identify any bias(es) you might have about the 
individual charged with the crime, the type of crime, or the individual 
with whom you will plea bargain. 
 
 
VIIII. Consider the other side’s perspective – If the other side were 




IX. Consider the other side’s perspective – If the other side were 




X. What are the client’s primary interests? 
 
For Defense Counsel, your client is the defendant. 
 




The Other Side’s Client: 
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XI. If you cannot agree on an acceptable plea bargain, 
What is your client’s BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement)310? 
 
What is the other side’s BATNA? 
 
 
XII. During your meeting with the other side, what questions do you 




XIII. During your meeting with the other side, what information 
about your case and your client do you want to make sure to convey? 
Please provide your rationale for the information you wish to convey. 
 
 
XIV. Given your client’s interests and the interests of the other side, 
what are some possible acceptable options to consider? Please explain 






 310 BATNA is the acronym used for the negotiation term “Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement.” Your BATNA is your best course of action if you are unable to resolve the issue 
at hand with your negotiating counterpart. See, Fisher, Roger & Ury, William, Getting to Yes 
at 101 (Penguin Books 2011). 
